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PANEL I:   Legal Issues in Sports 
Security 
Moderator:  Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
* 
Panelists: Milton  Ahlerich
† 
 Norman  Siegel
‡ 
  William D. Squires
§ 
  Paul H. Zoubek
|| 
 
MS. FREEDMAN:
#  Our first panel this morning is entitled 
“Legal Issues in Sports Security.” 
In the wake of the tragic events of September 11th,
1 security 
has been foremost in our minds.  While the measures that have 
been taken in response have enabled us to continue on with our 
 
*  Professor, Harvard Law School. A.B., Yale University, 1975; B.A., Oxford 
University, Rhodes Scholar, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1980. 
†   Vice President of Security, National Football League.  Assistant Director in Charge 
of Public Affairs; Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Lab, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1970–95.  B.A., Kansas State University, 1968. 
‡    Executive Director, Freedom Legal Defense and Education Project.  Executive 
Director, New York Civil Liberties Union, 1985–2001. B.A., Brooklyn College, 1965; 
J.D., New York University School of Law, 1968. 
§   Vice President and General Manager, Giants Stadium.  Commander, United States 
Naval Reserves.  Director of Stadium Operations, Cleveland Browns Stadium, 1999–
2000.  General Manager, Disney’s Wide World of Sports, 1996–99.  Director of Stadium 
Operations, New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, 1990–96.  Director of Stadium 
Operations, Yankee Stadium, 1987–90.  B.A., United States Naval Academy, 1975. 
||   Of Counsel, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads.  Counsel, New Jersey 
Domestic Preparedness Task Force.  First Assistant Attorney General, New Jersey 
Department of Law and Public Safety, 1999–2001.  Director, New Jersey Division of 
Criminal Justice, 1997–2000.  Deputy Chief, New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, 
1987–97.  Assistant U.S. Attorney, New Jersey, 1987–97.  B.A., cum laude, Woodrow 
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, 1978; J.D., 
New York University School of Law, 1982. 
#    Laura Freedman, Co-Symposium Editor, Fordham Sports Law Forum, Fordham 
University School of Law.  B.A., University of Delaware, 2000; J.D. expected, Fordham 
University School of Law, 2003. 
1 See  Robert D. McFadden, After the Attacks: The Overview; Stunned Rescuers Comb 
Attack Sites, But Thousands Are Presumed Dead; F.B.I. Tracking Hijackers’ Movements, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A1. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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everyday lives and provide us with a sense of safety, we must ask 
the cost of these measures.  At what point do the heightened 
security measures impede upon our rights so much that they 
diminish the very democratic rights we are protecting? 
This panel will examine such issues from the perspective of 
sports security.  Our panelists today will brief us on the types of 
security measures being taken by sports leagues and venues and 
examine how have they responded to this new America.  We will 
examine these measures and look at how in efforts to protect us, 
our legal rights may be even more at risk than ever. 
Without further ado, “Legal Issues in Sports Security.” 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much, Laura. 
I am delighted to be here today.  I think we have a fascinating 
panel. 
I will now ask the panelists to speak in the following order: 
Milton Ahlerich, William Squires, Paul Zoubek, and finally 
Norman Siegel. 
As I turn to Milton Ahlerich, I would ask him to deal with 
whatever issues he thinks would be of most interest to the 
audience, but I hope that in the course of his remarks he will talk 
about what he is currently worried about with respect to sports 
security, how his worries may have changed since September 11th, 
and what he is doing about his worries in the way of trying to 
ensure safety at sporting events. 
MR. AHLERICH: Thank you, Professor.  It is a real pleasure 
to be with you and have the opportunity to discuss these issues. 
We have been very focused over the last six months on doing 
the very best job we could to provide safety and security for our 
fans, and this presents a terrific opportunity for me to step back, 
reflect, and discuss with you some of the issues that are evolving. 
In my post as the Vice President of Security for the National 
Football League (NFL), we have a variety of security programs 
that deal with protecting our most important assets,
2 and our most 
 
2 See  Thomas George, N.F.L. Is Tightening Security As Games Resume on Sunday, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at C18; Bob Glauber, NFL Will Beef Up Security, NEWSDAY 
(N.Y.), Sept. 18, 2001, at A42. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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important assets are not only the game and the fans—certainly the 
events themselves are very, very high on the list—but also our 
most important human resources, our players.
3  They are extremely 
important to us, and looking after them and being sure that we are 
doing everything that we can to protect them and to avoid issues 
with them is also part of my job. 
In addition, we are looking at our most important business 
relationships and trying to be sure that those are good business 
relationships and that we are not doing business with people with 
whom we should not be doing business. 
The integrity of the game is probably the highest thing on our 
list, next to event security, in terms of an important asset that the 
NFL wants to be sure stays in place.
4  If you believe the game is 
fixed or you believe that people who are playing the game are 
betting, you will have a very poor opinion and you probably are 
not going to watch our games
5  So the integrity of the game is an 
important asset.  It is hard to manage. 
After September 11th the idea of where event security fit into 
our mix was high on the list.  If not the highest, it was certainly 
among the top two or three things that we did.  Event Security 
immediately became, through pronouncement by our 
commissioner, the number one priority of the National Football 
 
3 See Jason Wilde, Security to Take Center Stage; Players, Officials, Fans on Alert in 
Wake of Terrorist Attacks, WIS. STATE  J., Sept. 24, 2001, at C1. 
4 See Brian Peterson, Security Is Job 1 With NFL’s Ahlerich, NFL INSIDER, 2002, 
http://www.superbowl.com/xxxvi/ce/feature/0,3892,4897815,00.html (last visited Mar. 
16, 2003). 
5 See  generally Molinas v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) 
(upholding then-National Basketball Association [NBA] president’s decision to 
indefinitely suspend Jack Molinas, a popular basketball player in the 1950s, for placing 
bets on his team, the Pistons). 
[I]n order to effectuate its important and legitimate policies against gambling, 
and restore and maintain the confidence of the public vital to its existence, . . . 
the league was justified in determining that it was absolutely necessary to avoid 
even the slightest connection with gambling, gamblers, and those who have 
done business with gamblers, in the future. 
Id. at 244. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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League.
6  He said repeatedly that the NFL could stand a lot of 
mistakes; we could make a lot of bad business decisions, we could 
have bad business partners, we could have bad problems with our 
most important human resources, but we could not, perhaps, 
survive a terrorist attack or a large loss of life in one of our venues, 
at one of our games.
7  That is a very strong statement. 
The commissioner formed a task force to deal with security 
immediately and to make recommendations to him as well as to all 
of the owners as to what should be done to preserve and harden our 
events and make them safer.
8  He appointed the Task Force of 
Stadium Security and Crowd Management Professionals.  I was 
chair of the committee.
9 
Over an eight to ten week period the task force met and 
evolved into publishing a set of best practices for NFL stadiums 
and best practices for security [hereinafter “Best Practices 
Guide”].
10  Those best practices, in turn, were provided to stadium 
managers and owners, recognizing that we do not have direct 
control over these venues.
11  These venues are owned by cities, 
states and in some instances, the team owners themselves. 
 
6 See George, supra note 2 (quoting Ahlerich, explaining, “The commissioner said to 
the owners that the No. 1 priority is security and that we are not going to fall short in that 
area.”). 
7 See Ron Hurst et al., American Sports As a Target of Terrorism: The Duty of Care 
After September 11th, http://www.mmwr.com/_uploads/uploaddocs/publications/ 
american%20sports%20as%20A%20TARGET%20of%20terrorism.pdf (last visited Mar. 
25, 2003). 
8 See Wilde, supra note 3 (“[C]ommissioner Paul Tagliabue convened a security task 
force this week—headed by Ahlerich, who spent [twenty-five] years with the FBI—and 
outlined a number of behind-the-scenes security measures.”). 
9 Id. 
10 See Glauber, supra note 2; Hurst, supra note 7. 
In the aftermath of September 11th, most leagues, teams and venues went 
through a comprehensive threat assessment and established updated security 
guidelines and practices to meet the increased threat.  The National Football 
League [hereinafter NFL], by way of example, created a security task force and 
issued to teams a “best practices guide” [hereinafter Best Practices Guide] of 
recommended security measures before resuming play. 
Nick Cafardo, Patriots Plan to Play It Safe, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2001, at E2. 
11 See, e.g., Cafardo, supra note 10 (“The NFL has issued guidelines to all teams on 
how to proceed with security  .  .  .”); Hurst, supra  note 7 (“The National Football 
League . . . created a security task force and issued to teams a [Best Practices Guide] of 
recommended security measures before resuming play.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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That is a commonly misunderstood thing about the NFL, the 
idea that it is a hierarchical organization and the Commissioner can 
decree what he wants done from Park Avenue. In actuality, he has 
limited authority in that area.
12  He can urge, he can write some 
policies, and if all the owners sign on to it, things can get done.
13  
And that is exactly what happened here with the Best Practices 
Guide. 
Then we hired an independent security firm to put together 
what I would call an audit, for lack of a better description, to make 
an assessment of each stadium to see how they were doing in 
actually having best practices performed in their stadiums on non-
game day and game day.
14  This was an extensive review done by 
security professionals, not the NFL Security Department.  We hope 
they are professional—I believe they are professional—and they 
have now been completed and sent back to the teams and will be 
provided to the stadiums to implement the recommendations to 
ensure that we are doing the very best that we can. 
I want to underscore that doing this work, which is expensive, 
is not all—well, first and foremost, it is a business decision.
15  This 
is business.  These owners enjoy an important part of the American 
scene in entertainment and sports, but they are also in business, 
and it is important that their business be preserved.  This is 
common sense.  We are going to preserve our fans and take care of 
our fans. 
The implementation of the recommendations will be an 
interesting project to watch how it goes.  Mostly the stadiums have 
 
12 See,  e.g., John Clayton, Realignment Ended Up Being Fairly Easy for NFL, ESPN, at 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/clayton_john/1203162.html (May 22, 2002) (showing 
that a vote by NFL team owners is necessary to alter existing league structure or policy). 
13 See,  e.g., id. (noting that, due to NFL owners’ willingness to compromise and 
bargain, it took only one hour to secure enough votes for the latest realignment of the 
thirty-two-team league into eight divisions). 
14 See Ted Curtis, Sept. 11 Made Many of Us Reassess, 88 A.B.A. J. 39 (2002) (noting 
that Jeff Pash, the NFL’s executive vice president and principal in-house counsel, hired 
an independent firm to audit each stadium’s compliance with the anti-terrorism template). 
15 See  generally  Hurst, supra note 7 (considering the prudence of assessing risks and 
developing industry best practices for sporting events in order to meet the duty of care for 
athlete and fan invitees in the wake of the September 11th tragedy). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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been terrific at it.
16  They have taken the Best Practices Guide and 
done a very good job—not that I am a judge of the stadiums.  I am 
not.  Mr. Squires will, I am sure, speak to this issue.  He is a 
professional who runs stadiums.
17  I have never run a stadium.  We 
had some people on the task force who had. 
The idea here was to make strong recommendations to the 
teams to implement these best practices to the extent possible.  The 
balancing of the invasive efforts to protect our fans, what might be 
considered invasive by some, I think is an important area that 
needs to be discussed.  How far can we go with physical searches?  
How much permission is needed as fans enter the stadium to 
protect the fans at large and our business?  Our experience has 
been since September 11th enormous acceptance and help from the 
public and our fans.  The complaints that we have received have 
been along two lines, if you were to characterize them.  Number 
one: you are not doing enough; why are you not doing more?
18  
And number two: you are not consistent.
19  We did not get that 
everyplace, but we would occasionally receive those complaints. 
I will end with my comment as to our biggest concern in going 
forward, and that is very simple.  It is complacency.  We are 
vigilant and we are going to push as hard as we can to do the right 
thing to protect our fans, but we understand that complacency 
could be our largest issue as we go forward with our fans, stadium 
managers, owners, and those who would spend the money to make 
us more secure.
20 
Thank you. 
 
16 See,  e.g.,  Tom Withers, Browns Security Director Says Fans Safe, HOLLAND 
SENTINEL (Mich.), Sept. 20, 2001, http://www.thehollandsentinel.net/stories/092101/ 
spo_0921010055.shtml. 
17 See generally infra notes 22–55 and accompanying text. 
18 See  David Firestone, In Security Matters, Playing Field Is Level, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2002, at D8 (quoting an NFL fan enthusiastic about the extent of searches: “‘I’ve never 
been searched like this in my life—isn’t it great?’”). 
19 See  id.  (quoting an NFL fan who was concerned with consistency: “They said it was 
everybody, and it had better be.”). 
20 See  Steve Cameron, Venues Revisit Safety vs. Cost As September 11th Recedes, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 11–17, 2002, at 1 (noting that as few as six 
months after the September 11th tragedies, some sports facility managers were 
considering decreasing or abandoning some of the enhanced security measures enacted to 
protect their venues against terrorism). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much. 
Before we go to the next speaker, I wonder if you could just 
clarify one thing.  That is, you said that the NFL has issued 
recommendations involving best practices. 
MR. AHLERICH: Yes. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Then you also said that one of the big 
issues is how far it is appropriate to go, especially with respect to 
searches. 
MR. AHLERICH: Yes. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: What does the Best Practices Guide 
say about searches? 
MR. AHLERICH: It recommends that for a bag, or any items 
required into the stadium, we would request and receive a consent 
search from all patrons as they would come in, all fans.
21  That is 
recommended. 
The idea is to have a strong, careful visual inspection of the 
patrons before they come in, as well as a touching or patting of the 
outer garments. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: And if somebody refuses permission, 
then presumably that person does not get into the stadium? 
MR. AHLERICH: That is correct. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much. 
So now, Mr. Squires, as with Milton Ahlerich, you have a lot 
of experience in the sports business and in stadium security, so I 
hope that you will talk about whatever you think would be most 
interesting to the audience, but I hope too that you will specifically 
respond to issues about how your concerns have changed since 
September 11th, what you are doing about those concerns, and 
maybe specifically what you are doing with the Best Practices 
Guide given to you by the NFL. 
MR. SQUIRES: Sure. 
 
21 Hurst,  supra note 7 (noting that the NFL’s Best Practices Guide recommends “use of 
hand held metal detectors and search of all small bags and personal items”). See also Eric 
Fisher, NFL Promises ‘Unprecedented’ Commitment to Fan Safety, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 
21, 2001, at C10. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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I am assuming we have all Jets and Giants fans in here, right?  
Any Cowboys fans?  Do not identify yourself. 
Giants Stadium is twenty-six years young this year.
22 We have 
had 48 million people come through our gates.
23  I know this is a 
sports symposium, but we have had the Pope,
24 we have had more 
concerts than people can imagine,
25 we have Major League 
Soccer,
26 the North American Soccer League,
27 and the New 
Jersey Generals.
28 
I like to think that my staff is probably the best in the business 
at what they do.  Giants Stadium is the busiest non-baseball 
stadium in the country;
29 2.63 million people came through our 
turnstiles last year,
30 the second-best year we have ever had.  We 
netted about $18 million.
31  It was a great year for us. 
 
22  New York Giants, Game Day: Giants Stadium,  at http://www.giants.com/facility 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (noting the date of the Giants’ debut in Giants Stadium as 
Oct. 10, 1976). 
23  Giants Stadium Fast Facts,  at http://www.meadowlands.com/stadium/fastfacts.asp 
(n.d.). 
24 See Glauber, supra  note 2; Edward Wong, Guard Is Up for Stadium Security 
Officials Across the Country, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at D8 (noting that Giants 
Stadium already had a blueprint for heightened security, as measures had been enhanced 
during “the Persian Gulf War, a 1995 visit by Pope John Paul II and the 1994 World 
Cup”). 
25 See,  e.g.,  Welcome to the Meadowlands Sports Complex, Meadowlands, at 
www.meadowlands.com (n.d.).  See the main page and “Event Calendar” for a schedule 
of competitions and concerts. Id. 
26  Giants Stadium Fast Facts, supra note 23 (noting the past and present tenants of 
Giants Stadium including the New York/New Jersey Metrostars (MSL)(1996–present), 
New Jersey Cosmos (NASL)(1977–85) and the New Jersey Generals (USFL)(1983–85)). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See John Brennan, Turf’s Up at the Meadowlands, RECORD (Begen County, N.J.), 
Dec. 31, 2002, at S5 (quoting George Zoffinger, president of the New Jersey Sports and 
Exhibition Authority: “Giants Stadium is the busiest stadium in the country with two 
NFL teams and a Major League Soccer team [the MetroStars] as well as numerous 
concerts and other events.”). 
30 See N EW  JERSEY  SPORTS  & EXPOSITION  AUTHORITY, ANNUAL  REPORT  20  (2001) 
(noting that the 2001 total attendance for Giants Stadium and Continental Arena Airlines 
combined was over 4 million), http://www.njsea.com/Offers/pdf/NJSEA2001AnnRpt. 
pdf. 
31  See Associated Press, Metro Briefing New Jersey: Trenton: State Aid for 
Meadowlands to Drop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at F4 (announcing 2001’s net 
revenue at $17.5 million). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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Before September 11th safety was our paramount concern, and 
it is even more paramount now, if you can believe that.  I look at 
security as a good boxing referee: you know he is there, but you do 
not see him a lot.
32 
Has anybody been to any events at Giants Stadium since 
September 11th? 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS: Yes. 
MR. SQUIRES: What we have done is major deterrence.
33  As 
you come through the toll plazas, you see state police cars out 
there.  We now do our checks outside the gates rather than inside 
the gates, and inside that corral area are state police.
34  When you 
come through the turnstiles, the first thing you see are state police 
cars.  When you go to your seat, you see state police walking 
around the concourse, which is something we have not done 
before.
35  So it is a deterrent for anybody who may think that we 
might be an easy target. 
It costs $40,000 more per game to do that.  There are other 
things that are included in that—which the Jets and the Giants do 
not participate in.  The New Jersey Sports and Exposition 
Authority, which owns and governs Giants Stadium, pays for 
that.
36  But you cannot put a price tag on a life—well, I guess 
 
32 See Glauber, supra note 2. 
33 See  id.; Wong, supra note 24 (noting that Giants Stadium sits “across the Hudson 
River from the  .  .  . World Trade Center” and commenting that for weekend football 
games, “There will be more people with guns and uniforms there  .  .  . than at some 
minimum security prisons.”). 
34 See  generally  Wong, supra note 24 (explaining that “[t]he Meadowlands uses in-
house security guards and the New Jersey State Police to staff events” and that their 
numbers would be increased and their presence would be more visible in response to the 
heightened security threat). 
35 See  generally  id. 
36  See New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, Meadowlands Sports Complex 
Calculates $3.2 Million Negative Impact From World Trade Center Attack,  at 
http://www.njsea.com/SearchResult/SearchResultDetails.asp (Nov. 28, 2001). See also 
Leonard Shapiro, NFL Is Making Plans for Super Bowl Security, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 
2001, at D5 (describing NFL owners and NFL Players Association discussions about 
sharing the increased costs of providing additional security in response to September 
11th); Wong, supra note 24 (noting that the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority 
runs Giants Stadium). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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maybe the Navy can; I think it’s $330,000 for lost life—but I 
cannot put a price tag on a life at my stadium.
37 
My goal is to get fans there, make sure they enjoy their 
experience and make sure they get home safely.  If I accomplish 
that twenty times a year, I am 20–0. 
Milt and I have worked closely together.  We’re fortunate.   
Because we are in New York, we have the NFL out there all the 
time.  Because we are in New York, the Major League Soccer 
Commissioner is out there a lot.  I do not consider that pressure.  I 
consider that a good thing.  I think when Milt came out he saw that 
we took this seriously and we did the best we could, and I think we 
have done a terrific job. 
I agree with him; complacency is an issue.
38  I was recently 
interviewed for an article in Street & Smith’s Sports Business 
Journal, and two of my compatriots in this country agreed with me 
that complacency and being on the tip of the spear and really 
watching what we are doing is important.
39  There was a comment 
from a so-called terrorist expert who says if we are focused on 
terrorism five years from now in the sports business, then there is 
something wrong.
40  I told that person, “Why don’t you come and 
live in New Jersey and look at that skyline every day and you tell 
me differently.”
41 
Nothing good came out of September 11th, and I cannot use 
enough adjectives that can describe that, but one by-product is that 
my staff will never get complacent on my watch.  It will not 
happen.  Every time they do, I just take them to one of my spirals 
 
37  All members of the uniformed services are offered insurance under Servicemembers’ 
Group Life Insurance for the maximum amount of $250,000. See  Servicemembers’ 
Group Life Insurance (SGLI),  at http://www.military.com/Resources/ 
ResourceFileView?file=VETERANS_LIFE_INSURANCE_SGLI.HTM (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2003). 
38 See  Cameron,  supra  note 20; Thomas George, League to Increase Security at 
Stadiums, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2002, § 8, at 6. 
39 See  Cameron, supra note 20. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. See also Wong, supra note 24. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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that face southern Manhattan
42 and I say, “Take a look and what 
don’t you see anymore?” 
If you read my bio, you know I went to the United States Naval 
Academy.  I am still in the Reserves.  I strongly believe in this 
country.  I strongly believe in the people who come visit my 
facility.  And it is not just my facility.  You know, we are in the 
business of selling entertainment: I have an arena, I have a race 
track, and I want people to enjoy themselves coming to my 
stadium, feel safe, and then maybe buy a ticket to go to the race 
track or go to the arena for a hockey game or a basketball game. 
Going to the safety of our guests—in the past, we did a bottle 
and cans check.
43  We would open up bags or we would have the 
guest open up the bag to show us what they had.  We would not 
touch it.  We would let them fumble through the bag and show us 
what was in there. 
Since September 11th, it has been an amazing transformation.  
The guests want us to search them.  My philosophy is that I do not 
know that they want us to search them as much as they want to 
make sure that we are searching the people on their left and right.  
And I am telling you we have done it, and we have not had one 
phone call. 
A couple of issues we had where we made some mistakes were 
male guards searching females—and I mean searching.
44  It is not a 
head-to-toe, you know, get up against the wall.  It is like Milt said: 
open your jacket, let us go through your bag.  We corrected that. 
The phone calls that we have received have been exactly what 
Milt has said, that we have not been consistent enough and we are 
 
42 See  generally  Frank Litsky, Jumpy Giants Welcome a Respite and the Chance to 
Pitch In, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at C8 (noting the view of the lower Manhattan 
skyline from the Giants Stadium complex). 
43  Giants Stadium Expands Security Procedures; Fans Encouraged to Enter Stadium 
Early,  at www.giants.com/facility/index.cfm?cont_id=76702 (Oct. 4, 2001) (“The 
existing policy of prohibiting bottles (glass or plastic), cans, umbrellas, video 
cameras/recording devices or any items deemed by management to be dangerous or 
inappropriate remains in effect.”). 
44 See,  e.g., Rhoda Amon, On the Go, NEWSDAY  (N.Y.), Feb. 17, 2002, at E3 
(discussing female travelers’ complaints of “being ‘touched inappropriately’ by male 
screeners” following security increases in the wake of September 11th). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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probably not searching as well as they would like us to search 
them. 
That being said, we are going to continue.  I have Major 
League Soccer starting next Saturday.
45 We have a place called 
Checkpoint Charlie—I mean, you would think we are back in 
Vietnam.
46  It is an area where there is a straight drive-through into 
the west end of the Stadium.
47  We have put up yellow Jersey 
Barriers, we have state police out there with their suburban 
vehicles and we have two bomb-sniffing dogs.
48 
This past year, a New York Jet by the name of Damien 
Robinson unfortunately forgot that he had an assault rifle in the 
trunk of his car and our dog found it.
49  He was fined $30,000 by 
the team—I think it was by the team.
50  He still has not gone to 
court yet.
51  But it just goes to show you that there are no 
exceptions to this rule. 
We do not allow anything into the gate.  We allow women’s 
purses.  We allow diaper bags, but there better be a baby with that 
diaper bag.  We do not regulate the size of the purse, although we 
do not want you bringing one of those big old beach bags. 
It is not just that we are concerned about a suspicious item 
being in that bag, but if the bag is left under a water fountain, just 
 
45  MetroStars,  MetroStars Schedule—April 2002,  at  http://www.metrostars.com/ 
schedule/april.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) (noting that the Metrostars 2002 opening 
game versus the Chicago Fire was played on April 20, 2002). 
46 See  generally  Michael Vega, It’s a Tight Ship at Stadium, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 
2001, at E7 (explaining that “Checkpoint Charlie” seems to be a derivative of “Defcon 
Charlie,” the code name for the second highest state of security alert at the United States 
Naval Academy). 
47 See  Glauber, supra note 2 (noting that the Giants Stadium practice of closing some 
entrances off to route traffic for security purposes). 
48 See  generally Wong, supra note 24 (discussing security measures taken at Giants 
Stadium). 
49 Ken  Berger,  Weapons Arrest for Jet; Assault Rifle, Ammunition Found in Back of 
Robinson’s SUV, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 17, 2001, at A76; Mike Freeman, Pro Football: 
Inside NFL: Some Players Arming Themselves for Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 8, 
at 7. 
50 Berger,  supra note 49 (“Jets coach Herman Edwards, after consulting the NFL 
commissioner’s office, fined Robinson $30,000.”). 
51 See Jim Litke, Leniency for NFL Troublemakers Wrong, HAMILTON  SPECTATOR 
(Ont.), Nov. 9, 2001, at E5 (“The case against Damien Robinson is still pending.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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inadvertently left and forgotten, in this heightened security, if 
somebody sees that and says, “Oh my God, an abandoned bag,” 
and before you know it, people are running out of the stadium, and 
all it is a sweatshirt and a set of binoculars, that is our biggest 
concern.
52  That is a huge concern. 
We have had two strange instances—not strange, but just two 
stupid things on people’s parts that have really shown me the 
attention to detail. 
We had a gentleman come to the gates.  He had something that 
we requested he return to his car.  He did not want to walk all the 
way back to his car.  He went up to a woman who was parking her 
car in the general vicinity and said, “Could you please put this in 
your car and after the game I will come and get it from your car?”  
She said, “Absolutely not.”  He took the item, threw it under a car, 
and one of my security guards saw it. Within minutes, the state 
police were out there, the area was taped off, we have dogs
53—I 
mean, we take everything very seriously. 
The next instance involved a guy who was coming to the gates 
with a cooler.  He was informed he could not bring his cooler in.  
He had a thermos.  He gave the thermos to his wife and said, 
“Here, honey, you take the bomb in.”  Well, within five minutes, 
he was down in the state police office.  We released him.  We 
warned him. We talked to the team about the ticket holder. There is 
no joking.  It is not a joking matter.  And, as Milt said, the guests 
are the ones who really want us to continue to provide the security. 
The biggest issue we still have is aviation.  The phrase “no fly 
zone” came out very early on after September 11th around 
stadiums.
54  If you have ever flown into Newark—and I think that 
 
52 See,  e.g., Douglas Futch et al., Hearsfield Security: Reaction, ATLANTA J. & CONST., 
Nov. 18, 2001, at 9A (describing the panic and complete shutdown of Chicago’s O’Hare 
Airport after a traveler forgot his camera bag in the terminal and left without retrieving it 
out of fear of missing his flight). 
53 Bryan  Burwell,  Sports Aren’t Immune to Threat of Terror That Lurks Everywhere, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, at B1 (“Rifle-toting state troopers with bomb-sniffing dogs 
ring Giant Stadium for every sporting event.”). 
54  Tom Bowman et al., Terrorism Strikes America: The Response, BALT. SUN, Sept. 21, 
2001, at 1A (“[T]he Federal Aviation Administration enacted a defensive measure at 
home, declaring a ‘no-fly zone’ within three miles of major professional and college 
sporting events.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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everybody has—if you ever sat on the port side of the airplane and 
looked out the window—“port” is a Navy term for left
55—if you 
look out there and you look down, you see Giants Stadium.  I have 
had people call me and tell me that aviation should ban all flights 
on Sundays because of the NFL.  I try to explain to them that the 
NFL is big but the aviation industry is just a little bit bigger. 
But as time has gone on, it has gotten easier and easier for us.  
My concern is—and we are lucky—Giants Stadium is not like 
some of the NFL facilities that all they do is play NFL games.  I 
have soccer starting up, I will have some concerts this summer,
56 I 
will do all my emergency evacuation drills, all my fire drills, I will 
do my training, so on August 5th, our first preseason game 
between the Giants and the Houston Texans, we will be ready.  It 
is those teams that maybe perform thirteen to fourteen events a 
year, that have a six-month hiatus between their last game and their 
next game, they are the ones I really think that have to 
continuously train and emphasize.  And we do have that skyline to 
look at, so it makes it a little easier for my staff to understand why 
it is so important. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much. 
If I could, again, just ask one small clarificatory question: both 
you and Mr. Ahlerich have alluded to some complaints or concerns 
about consistency with respect to which practices designed to 
ensure security are applied.  Now, I could imagine two kinds of 
concerns about consistency.  One would be that you do not look 
hard enough at everybody.  The other kind of concern would be 
that you look in some sense too hard, you single out some group of 
people, possibly on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, whatever it 
might be.  Which or both of these kinds of complaints have you 
had and how valid do you regard the complaints as being? 
MR. AHLERICH: We have had nothing forwarded to the 
League Office that said that anyone was singled out.  The 
complaints were more, “I was searched more thoroughly than I 
saw other people being searched.”  We have received that.  Then 
 
55 A MERICAN  HERITAGE  DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH  LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) 
(defining port as “the left-hand side of a ship or aircraft facing forward”). 
56 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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we received, “I walked right in.  I walked in and they did not look 
through my bag very well.  What kind of security is that?”  Those 
are the two types that I have seen. 
MR. SQUIRES: I agree.  There have not been any instances of 
profiling at all.  It has been, “Well, I saw somebody get in with a 
bag and the bag was oversized,” or we had a situation early on 
where we did not have the appropriate female guards at the gates to 
search females, so we would not touch them, for sure, but we let 
them in without doing the search that we were doing to other male 
guests.  Those are the inconsistencies we have had. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Now Paul Zoubek.  I know one of the 
things I would be interested in is your reaction to what is being 
done by the NFL, what is being done at Giants Stadium.  If these 
were your clients, how would you advise them?  Are they doing 
enough, too much, or ought they to be doing something else?  How 
do you react to what you have heard? 
MR. ZOUBEK: I think what we need to focus on is the need to 
balance the continuing threat of terrorism with the need to get back 
to business.  But that is one of the most difficult questions we, as a 
nation, have ever faced. 
As an interesting segue on the last topic that was mentioned by 
Bill, for all of us, much like when Kennedy was shot, we will 
always talk about where we were on September 11th.
57  I  w a s  
chairing a panel of community members and law enforcement on 
how to eradicate racial profiling in Atlantic City, New Jersey.   
With us at the time was the Chief of Police of Port Authority and 
the Chief of Police of Montgomery County, Virginia.  We had to 
helicopter both of them out of the conference. 
I then spent time as First Assistant Attorney General working 
on New Jersey’s reaction to the attack.  Our immediate questions 
were: “What do we do now?  What do we do next?  What are our 
 
57 See  generally Vivian Berger, Every Generation Faces Its Moment of Truth, NAT’L L. 
J., Sept. 24, 2001, at A26; Marie Cocco, Respect and Sorrow, RECORD (Bergen County, 
N.J.), Sept. 11, 2002 (“September 11 was not like Pearl Harbor.  It was more like the day 
JFK was shot. . . .  JFK’s death is the touchstone that people reach for, an instinctive 
connection made without conscious thought.  It was a cataclysmic event that was 
incomprehensible, yet comprehended immediately as innocence lost.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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threats?  What targets do we need to harden?”  As part of the 
immediate response, state troopers and National Guard were sent 
to guard the nuclear reactors, and to the vents of the Holland 
Tunnel.
58 
At that point in time, what did we know?  We knew we had 
just suffered the worst attack on domestic soil in our history.
59  But 
we did not know what was the next target, so what we had to do 
was undertake a total assessment of all the potential targets in New 
Jersey, ranking them, and deploying the available resources to 
meet those potential threats.
60 
During that same period of time the NFL and stadium owners 
were conducting their threat assessments and determining what 
they needed to do. 
Well, here we are six months later.  Thankfully, we have routed 
the Taliban, but Osama bin Laden is at large.
61  We have not had 
any further anthrax incidents, but we also have not caught the 
evildoer at fault.
62 
I think what we have learned is that one of our greatest threats 
is complacency.  We should not only focus on the missing World 
Trade Center as a symbol to remind us of the threat but we should 
also recognize that New Jersey and New York have been a 
 
58 See,  e.g., Press Release, Office of Pennsylvania Governor Mark Schweiker, 
Governor Calls Up National Guard to Secure Nuclear Facilities Through Wednesday, 
Nov. 7 (Nov. 2, 2001) (announcing the deployment of the Pennsylvania National Guard 
to guard Pennsylvania’s nuclear power plants), http://www.pahouse.com/veon/ 
schweikerrelease.htm; News Release, New Jersey Department of Military & Veterans 
Affairs [NJDMAVA], NJDMAVA Deploys to New Jersey Conference of Mayors (May 
1, 2002), http://www.state.nj.us/military/news/archive2002/1may02njdmavadeploys. 
html. 
59 See George Vecsey, The Mayor Was There For the Yanks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6 , 
2001 (quoting Mayor Rudy Giuliani, identifying the September 11, 2001 attacks as “the 
worst attack in the history of our country”). 
60 See  Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Nation: Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 
27, 2002, at A7. 
61  Pursuing bin Laden, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 11, 2002, at A16 (noting that Americans 
are frustrated that, despite the defeat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, bin Laden remains at 
large). 
62  The Nation; FBI Laments Lack of Anthrax Arrests, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at A25 
(“FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III expressed dissatisfaction . . . that those responsible 
for last year’s deadly anthrax attacks had not yet been caught.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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breeding ground for terrorists, New Jersey in particular.  In the 
1993 bombing some of the terrorists were from Jersey City and in 
the most recent attack, some had lived in Patterson.
63 
So what do we know about our threat?  I think we know that it 
is a real and continuing threat.  And I think we have to recognize 
that it is a threat that challenges our very existence as a nation.  
What we really have to do—and one of the statements I heard from 
some of the heads of our Emergency Management in New Jersey I 
think is very apropos: “We have to establish security as a way of 
life.” 
Last night, when my flight from Detroit was canceled, all the 
passengers on my flight had to go to the other end of the airport 
from USAir terminal to the Delta terminal.  All sixty of us then had 
to line up to be searched.  The flight was delayed two hours, I did 
not hear a peep from anyone.  They were all thankful that that was 
occurring. 
But how do we balance the continuing threat that we know we 
have against the cost of continuing some of the measures that the 
NFL and some of the stadiums have been involved in? 
I really think what the NFL and some of the stadiums have 
done is absolutely what has been needed to be done, which is 
conduct a threat assessment, look where you can meet some of 
your potential vulnerabilities and establish a policy like Best 
Practices for your particular industry.
64 
Next, you have to educate the public as to what those practices 
are, because the public will be cooperative.  If you are doing 
 
63 Joseph  Grinstein,  Jihad and the Constitution: The First Amendment Implications of 
Combating Religiously Motivated Terrorism, 105 YALE  L.J. 1347, 1348–49 (1996) 
(identifying the terrorists at fault in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as being New 
Jersey residents); Aaron Brown, The Anthrax Investigation, CNN Transcripts, at 
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/16/asb.00.html (Oct. 16, 2001) (reporting 
that some of the suspected hijackers stayed in a Patterson, New Jersey, apartment before 
the attacks). 
64 See  Hurst, supra note 7 (“In the aftermath of September 11th, most leagues, teams 
and venues went through a comprehensive threat assessment and established updated 
security guidelines and practices to meet the increased threat.  The [NFL] . . . issued to 
teams a [Best Practices Guide]  of recommended security measures before resuming 
play.”); Andrew Mason, Security: NFL’s “No. 1 Priority”, NFL News, at 
http://www.nfl.com/news/2001/security_092001.html (Sept. 20, 2001). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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searches across the board and you are announcing them, I think 
that it will be accepted and appropriate. 
Obviously, as someone who was very much involved in some 
of the New Jersey State Police racial profiling issues and the 
reforms in New Jersey, we cannot let this threat become a new 
impetus, like the War on Drugs was, for instances of racial 
profiling on a security threat.
65  I think the measures that have been 
set up, that are set up across the board at the facilities, are the 
appropriate way to go. 
American sports is a very symbolic target of terrorism because 
it is so associated with the globalization of the American economy 
and the American culture.
66  Young kids throughout the world are 
wearing those jerseys, they are wearing their Nike shirts, their Nike 
shoes, and the terrorists are looking for a symbol to target.  That is 
why so much effort was put in at the Olympics.
67  That is why so 
much effort was put in at the Super Bowl and at some of the larger 
events.
68 What we have to do is just establish security as a way of 
life.
69 
I would submit that if your clients do not establish and follow 
the Best Practices Guide, they will have substantial issues as it 
relates to the duty of care that they owe to the participants and to 
the spectators.
70 
 
65 See Nicole Davis, The Slippery Slope of Racial Profiling: From the War on Drugs to 
the War on Terrorism, Color Lines, at *2, at http://www.arc.org/C_Lines/CLArchive/ 
story2001_12_05.html (Dec. 2001) (reporting that eighty percent of American citizens 
opposed racial profiling prior to September 11th, but seventy percent of citizens now 
believe some form of racial profiling may be necessary). 
66 See,  e.g., Roy Masters, Super Bowl Gets Peak Rating As Terrorists Target Audience, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 2, 2002 (referring to the Super Bowl as “the citadel of 
American commercialism” and as a potential terrorist target). 
67 Patrick  O’Driscoll,  Bottom Line on $310 M Security: Few Arrests, Games Wrap Up 
Safely, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2002, at 4D (“The Winter Olympics bought the best 
security that $310 million could buy. In the end, it worked.”). 
68 Brian  Schmitz,  Security Keeps Game Safe, Sound; The Well-Coordinated Massive 
Effort Ranked As Unprecedented for a U.S. Sporting Event, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 
2002, at C6 (noting that the “tightest security measures ever for a sporting event in the 
United States” were in place for Super Bowl XXXVI in the wake of the September 11th 
terror attacks). 
69 See  Cameron, supra note 20. 
70 See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 709 (Cal. 1992) (team owner liability); 
Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Center, Inc. 777 A.2d 380 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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I think that the measures that have been put in place so far have 
been reasonable.  I think one of the issues we have to focus on, as 
we look at issues with respect to facial recognition technology is 
potential effectiveness of the technology. 
If you have a “be on the lookout” alert that a suspected member 
of the Al-Qaeda is nearby in a particular location, I think it would 
be very reasonable to engage in facial recognition or other 
technology to try to identify whether that individual has infiltrated 
a facility.  A more generalized facial recognition program that does 
not rely on some targeting based upon realistic information may be 
more questionable. 
So I think it is something that we have to check on.  And I can 
tell you, as someone who has handed flags and urns to the family 
members of New Jersey residents who were lost, I think we all 
want to make sure that we have learned from this incident. 
And we are making sure that this comment that you referred to 
from Street & Smith’s,
71 that in five years from now if we are still 
doing this, then people are making a mistake—I take the absolute 
contrary view, which is, for my children, for my grandchildren, we 
have to establish this as a way of life and just accept the reasonable 
intrusion consistent with our constitutional principles. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much. 
Norman Siegel, I am sure you have a number of things to say 
and a number of things in response to what has been said. 
MR. SIEGEL: The horrific attack on the World Trade Center 
and the deaths of almost 3,000 innocent people on September 11, 
2001,
72 changed America and the world, perhaps for our lifetime.  
It has put our basic security into question and is now forcing us to 
consider issues of freedom and security, liberty, and order. 
The challenge facing us—and I think I agree with Paul at least 
in what he said—is to find a balance, a balance that protects our 
 
Div. 2001) (hockey rink not liable for failing to eradicate risk of spectators in bleachers 
getting hit by errant pucks); Hurst, supra note 7. 
71 See  Cameron, supra note 20. 
72  A Day of Terror; Bush’s Remarks to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2001, at A4 (quoting President George W. Bush’s address to the nation the 
evening of September 11th). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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safety while preserving the principles of freedom that are such an 
integral part of our national spirit.  I submit that we need not 
choose between safety and freedom. 
The Declaration of Independence described life and liberty as 
inalienable rights.
73  The Constitution declares that it was 
established both to “provide for the common defense” and “to 
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”
74 
In the difficult times ahead—and I think they are and will be 
difficult—we must continue to look to our Constitution as a beacon 
to guide us as we struggle to defend the principles for which it 
stands.  These times require that we be ever vigilant, ever 
outspoken, and ever strong in protecting freedom. 
The specific topic before us this morning is “Legal Issues in 
Sports Security.”  This issue was fundamentally affected by the 
September 11th attack, but the issue had already surfaced pre-
September 11th.  At a minimum, legal and, if I may add, policy, 
issues in sports security had arisen, for example, at the 1996 
Atlanta Summer Olympics,
75 as well as the 2001 Super Bowl in 
Tampa.
76 
This morning Mr. Ahlerich informed me that some of the 
public information regarding the Super Bowl in Tampa is incorrect 
and that the facial recognition was not in the stadium but was, if I 
understand him correctly—if not, correct me now—in the NFL 
Experience
77 that was taking place adjacent to the stadium itself 
and in a walkway from that facility to the stadium.
78 
As a minor point, I would recommend when there are public 
debates on these issues, if in fact the public debates are not 
 
73 T HE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
74 U.S.  CONST. pmbl. 
75 Derek  Jensen,  Security’s Tight, Relentless, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Feb. 17, 
2002 at A1. 
76  See Tampa Installs High-Tech Security Cameras, USA TODAY, July 7, 2001.
 
77  See Taking in Tampa, ABC News, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/sports/ 
DailyNews/superbowl_tampaguide_010118.html (Jan. 19, 2001) (“Open from January 
20th to the 28th [of 2001], the NFL Experience is a 20-acre interactive football-related 
theme park set in tents and open areas adjacent to Raymond James Stadium.”). 
78 Jeanne  Bonner,  Looking for Faces in the Super Bowl Crowd, Security Solutions, at 
http://www.securitysolutions.com/ar/security_looking_faces_super (Mar. 1, 2001). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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accurate, then people should jump-in and give the correct 
information.  It is silly to have a public debate about an issue if, in 
fact, the facts are not accurate. 
Since September 11th, the topic arose, at a minimum, in the 
2001World Series opener at Yankee Stadium,
79 the 2002 Super 
Bowl in New Orleans
80 and the 2002 Winter Olympics.
81 
The specific issue is: how do we as a democratic society 
committed to the principles and values of free movement, privacy, 
equality, and fairness provide adequate security and safety at 
public sporting events?  The challenge for all of us is to craft and 
implement—implement is very important—an appropriate balance. 
I also ask questions.  For example, when the task force was set 
up, were there any civil rights or civil liberties people on that task 
force?
82  Were there any people from the community?  Were 
people from the NAACP or the Urban League
83 or the Puerto 
Rican Legal Defense Fund
84 invited to participate in these 
discussions? 
It seems to me that, since sports is a business, business and 
management techniques should be inclusive so that we have the 
dialogue up-front, rather than the confrontations later on, on these 
very difficult issues.  I hope the answers to my questions are in the 
affirmative. 
Finding that appropriate balance might be difficult.  It might be 
okay theoretically, but then implementation is “a whole other 
ballgame,” to use that metaphor. 
 
79 See Bill Griffith, Good Memories Come to Mind Overflowing with Magic Moments, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2002, at E7. 
80  Hunter S. Thompson, For What It’s Worth, ESPN, at http://www.espn.go.com/ 
page2/s/thompson/020305.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
81 Brice  Wallace,
 Biometrics Is New Wave of Identification Technology, DESERT NEWS 
(Salt Lake City), Dec. 18, 2002 (“Facial recognition technology . . . was nearly put to 
work during the 2002 Olympic Winter Games.  .  .  . before the Salt Lake Organizing 
Committee turned thumbs down to the venture.”).
 
82 See  Wilde supra note 3; text accompanying note 9. 
83  See About Us; Mission Statement, National Urban League, at http://www.nul.org/ 
about/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). 
84 About  “PEARL-DEF”, Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Educucation Fund, at 
www.prldef.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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But we cannot, and should not be non-thoughtful, expedient, 
exclusive, or even glib, about this growing issue of public concern. 
Interestingly enough, I would agree with the speakers so far 
that if in fact five years from now this is not a major concern, then 
we have been irresponsible. 
As a result of a bomb exploding at the Atlanta Olympics,
85 
entrance to the sporting events was contingent upon going through 
a metal detector and surveillance of handbags, backpacks, and 
bags.
86  The 2000 Tampa Super Bowl, with the addition of the 
NFL Experience, introduced face recognition software technology 
to sporting events, at least publicly.
87  Who knows if it was taking 
place previously?  We do not know that.  The software reportedly 
digitized the facial images of fans in an attempt to match them with 
“mug shots” of people in a criminal database.
88 
The 2001 World Series opening game at Yankee Stadium 
introduced metal detectors, and I believe metal scanners, as a 
condition to watching a baseball game.
89 I believe the 2002 New 
Orleans Super Bowl and the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics 
continued the practice of metal detectors and metal scanners.
90 
 
85 Jensen,  supra note 75 (“[I]t was eight days into the last Olympics held on U.S. soil 
when a bomb exploded in Atlanta’s Centennial Park, killing one woman and injuring 
scores” of by-standers.). 
86  Eric Harrison & Robin Wright, More Troops Sent to Atlanta As Bomb Threats 
Increase, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2996, at A1 (“[T]he Georgia National Guard . . . [sent] an 
additional infantry battalion to the Games to help handbag-searches, metal detector 
operators and guards.”). 
87 Robert  Trigaux,  Cameras Scanned Fans for Criminals, ST. PETERSBURG  TIMES 
(Fla.), Jan. 31, 2001, at A1 (noting that Sunday’s Super Bowl was the first major sporting 
event to adopt face matching surveillance system). See also Lev Grossman, Welcome to 
the Snooper Bowl; Big Brother Came to Super Sunday, Setting Off a New Debate About 
Privacy and Security in the Digital Age, TIME, Feb. 12, 2001, at 72 (noting that the 
Tampa Bay police department (with the full cooperation of the NFL) used the FaceTrac 
surveillance system at the Super Bowl in Tampa). 
88  Todd R. Weiss, ACLU Slams Facial Recognition Software, CNN, at http://www.cnn. 
com/2002/TECH/ptech/01/08/aclu.face.recognition.idg/?related (Jan. 8, 2002). 
89 See  Mike Lopresti, From the Press Box: Stadium Security Tight in Today’s New 
World, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2001.
 
90 Mary  Foster,  Long Walks Among Extra Super Bowl Security, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 
29, 2002 (“Fans, vendors, media and VIPS will all be subject to thorough searches that 
could include X-ray machines, metal detectors and pat-downs.”). See also Jessica Reaves, 
Olympic Security: Life on High Alert: Terror Doesn’t Scare the Folks in Salt Lake, Who 
Are Adjusting Well to Living with Hourlong Security Delays, TIME, Feb. 12, 2002.
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First and foremost are the concerns regarding facial recognition 
software video surveillance.  To begin the analysis we must ask 
ourselves what security benefits the proposed technology will 
bring.  The burden of proof is on the proponent of the specific 
proposed technology.  She or he must demonstrate that the 
proposed technology will actually make us safer. 
Applying this approach to the facial recognition technology, 
we find out that the technology, though inviting in theory, does not 
seem to work.  In a November 2001 statement, the American Civil 
Liberties Union said: “Facial recognition software is easily tripped 
up by change in hair style or facial hair, by aging, weight gain or 
loss and by simple disguise.”
91 
In a November 20, 2001 press release the ACLU said, “A study 
by the Department of Defense found very high error rates even 
under ideal conditions where the subject is staring directly into the 
camera under bright lights.”
92  The study found very high rates of 
both false-positives
93 (which was defined as wrongly matching 
people with photos of others) and false-negatives
94 (defined as not 
catching people in the database).  That suggests that, if installed, 
these systems “would miss a high proportion of suspects included 
in the photo database and flag huge numbers of innocent people—
thereby lessening vigilance, wasting precious manpower resources, 
and creating a false sense of security.”
95 
Moreover, as the November 2001 statement pointed out that 
several government agencies “have abandoned facial recognition 
 
91 ACLU, ACLU Opposes Use of Face Recognition Software in Airports Due to 
Ineffectiveness and Privacy Concerns, at http://archive.aclu.org/features/f110101a.html 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
92  Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Calls on Fresno Airport to Remove Controversial 
Facial Recognition Technology, (Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint. 
cfm?ID=9262&c=39. 
93 See  DUANE  BLACKBURN ET AL., FACIAL  RECOGNITION  VENDOR  TEST  2000: 
EVALUATION  REPORT  (2001), http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/facialrecognition/DLs/ 
FRVT_2000.pdf.  See also P. Jonathon Phillips et al., An Introduction to Evaluating 
Biometric Systems, COMPUTER, Feb. 2000, at 56, http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/ 
facialrecognition/DLs/Feret7.pdf; Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, Drawing a Blank: The 
Failure of Facial Recognition Technology in Tampa, Florida, ACLU, at http://archive. 
aclu.org/issues/privacy/ drawing_blank.pdf (Jan. 3, 2002). 
94 Stanley  &  Steinhardt,  supra note 93.
 
95 Press  Release,  supra note 92.
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systems after finding they did not work as advertised, including the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, which experimented with 
using the technology to identify people in cars at the Mexico-U.S. 
border.”
96 
The ACLU concluded that “it is abundantly clear that the 
security benefits of such an approach would be minimal to 
nonexistent for a very simple reason: the technology does not 
work.”
97 
Let me just highlight some issues, and then maybe in questions 
I can go into more detail. 
I think there are going to be more video surveillance cameras 
in general.
98  I believe I read somewhere in one of the New York 
sports pages that Yankee Stadium is going to be putting in more 
video surveillance cameras.  I would not be surprised if major 
sports venues such as Madison Square Garden, Staples Center, 
Giants Stadium, and the Meadowlands begin to use the video 
surveillance technology. 
I think we need to develop guidelines.  Perhaps there should be 
a task force including the people that I mentioned. 
We do not oppose video surveillance as a general proposition 
or an absolute opposition.  The opposition usually comes with the 
fact that there are no guidelines, there is very often nonexistent or 
inadequate signage, and there are objections when the video stays 
in perpetuity. 
As a general proposition, if someone is using video 
surveillance for criminal activity, if, let us say, after seventy-two 
hours in observation, there is no criminal activity on the video, the 
video should be destroyed or erased.  We do not want a permanent 
government, private, or government/private database of innocent 
 
96 ACLU,  supra  note 91. See also Stefanie Olsen & Robert Lemos, Can Face 
Recognition Keep Airports Safe?, CNet, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
275313.html?tag=rn (Nov. 1, 2001).
 
97 ACLU,  supra note 91. See also Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 93.
 
98 See,  e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Video Surveillance Planned on Mall, WASH. POST, Mar. 
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Americans being filed somewhere in some Orwellian 1984 
situation.
99 
There are also questions of metal detectors.  In an interesting 
way, Logan Airport on the morning of September 11th makes the 
case as strong as possible that metal detectors in some interesting 
way are obsolete.  The terror hijackers used plastic knives.  The 
metal detector only detects metal.  So there has to be further 
discussion, again in the context of potential false security. 
My experience on racial—and now national origin—profiling 
is that everybody in the universe takes the position that there is no 
racial profiling.  Just the other day, the NYPD [the New York 
Police Department] said, “Never has been, isn’t, but we’re putting 
out a statement anyway to prohibit it.”
100  It is like censorship: 
there are no censors and nobody engages in censorship.  Nobody 
engages in racial profiling, yet it does, has and probably will 
continue, because just issuing a proclamation or having the head of 
the organization say the right thing does not mean that it trickles 
down to the street corner or to the ballpark.  That is where some of 
the focus must be. 
If we are serious about this, then all of the sports teams should 
set up some kind of mechanism—an ombudsperson, a complaint 
line—so that people in the community have confidence that the 
people are taking the implementation of these principles in a 
serious way, consistent with principles of equality and fairness. 
Just one last point and I will conclude.  In the short term, there 
may be security measures implemented to address the sense of 
imminent threat—for example, as I have mentioned, increase of 
metal detectors and surveillance cameras at public sporting 
facilities.  Where those measures and technologies reduce our basic 
freedoms, we should see them as temporary adjustments.  We must 
never learn to accept them as permanent adjustments.  Short-term 
 
99 See  GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (New Am. Library Trade 1983) (1948).  In 1984, the 
protagonist, Winston, lives in a country run by Big Brother, a political party that conducts 
video and audio surveillance of its citizens and prohibits independent thought. Id. 
100 See  Al Baker, Commissioner Bans Profiling Using Race by the Police, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2002, at B3.
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safety and security measures must not translate into permanent 
restrictions on our fundamental and precious freedoms. 
This is not inconsistent with the statements that have been 
made so far that five years from now we should still be looking at 
this issue.  But we should not in the short term buy into a society—
especially at sporting events, which I think are integral to the 
American culture—which erodes in a permanent way basic 
freedoms with which we have come to identify ourselves with in 
the world. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much. 
Let me just see if I can clarify for myself—and maybe some 
other people have the same question—where we stand now. 
If I understand Norman Siegel correctly, he is raising concerns 
about facial recognition technology, about the use of metal 
detectors, and about use of video surveillance cameras that might 
occur in the future, but if the NFL Best Practices Guidelines are 
indicative of what is currently going on, these practices are not 
currently being implemented, at least on a wide scale.  Is that 
right? 
MR. AHLERICH: Video surveillance cameras are very much a 
part of Best Practices, but not facial recognition.  A very distinct 
difference here, because you are comparing against a database with 
the facial recognition technology.
101  But the capturing of the 
images of patrons as they enter stadiums and during non-game 
days is certainly very much a part of Best Practices, with proper 
signage. 
And I would take exception there.  I certainly think we need to 
work hard, and it is part of Best Practices to ensure that adequate 
signage must be in place.  Absolutely it is required that you must 
give notice to patrons that they are under video surveillance as they 
enter and that their images are being captured. 
 
101 See Mark G. Milone, Biometric Surveillance: Searching for Identity, 57 BUS. LAW. 
497, 501 (2001); Public Places; Play Ball, but Ban the Backpacks, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 
2001, at 30.
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You certainly can argue the point that the expectation of 
privacy when you are at a public event or an event that you enter 
with a ticket would not require such signage,
102 but we think that it 
is appropriate to do that, and all NFL stadiums do that, or they are 
urged to do it. 
MR. SIEGEL: But, conceptually, it is not just privacy.  I think 
that the expectation of privacy is very low at a public event.
103  But 
it is the notion of anonymity.
104  When I go to Central Park 
tomorrow, it is not that I am yearning for privacy, but I want 
anonymity.  I do not want, unless there is a compelling government 
interest, for the government, and also for the private sector, to have 
my image and with whom I am associating.
105 
Why does the government, or the private sector or a 
combination of both have to know, and have an image of, Norman 
Siegel going to Shea Stadium, or to any facility?  You can have my 
image if, in fact, I am engaged in some criminal activity.
106  
Potentially, if there is some suspicious activity, you can make a 
strong argument there. 
But assuming none of the above, I do not think you have a right 
to have my image.  The government does not have a right to 
 
102  United States v. Harris, 402 U.S. 573 (1971) (setting forth the plain view doctrine, 
making it doubtful that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
appearance).
 
103  Nina W. Tarr, Clients’ & Students’ Stories: Avoiding Exploitation and Complying 
with the Law to Produce Scholarship with Intent, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 289 (1998) 
(“The concerns about privacy, autonomy and dignity are not raised by this pure 
observation of public events when persons have no expectation of privacy or 
confidentiality . . . .”). 
104  Courts have recognized a right to anonymity when related to exercising one’s First 
Amendment right to association, but have stated that there is no general right to 
anonymity.  See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nordbrock v. Jensen, Nos. 88-
2868, 89-15171, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19295 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 1, 1990). 
105 See Church of Hakeem v. Alameda County, 168 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(holding that the government failed to demonstrate the compelling state interest necessary 
to justify disclosure of the membership lists of the Church of Hakeem, stating that “the 
anonymity of that membership remains protected by their [First Amendment] right of 
associational privacy”). 
106  United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom, 489 U.S. 749, 751 
(1989) (“In 1924 Congress appropriated funds to enable the Department of Justice 
(Department) to establish a program to collect and preserve fingerprints and other 
criminal identification records.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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fingerprint—there are certain exceptions, such as employment 
situations—people who are law-abiding.
107  It seems to me those 
concepts have to apply in this new technology. 
For example, I would like to know, when you said that the NFL 
is using video surveillance, and will be doing more of this, 
currently what happens to those images?  Is there a database that 
the NFL has on people who come into the games? 
MR. AHLERICH: The answer is no. 
MR. SIEGEL: That is good to hear. 
MR. ZOUBEK: If I could speak to this, I understand the issue 
about having a database so that we are getting into an Orwellian 
era in which you are tracking individuals.
108  But, having sat at the 
FBI Command Center in Newark days after September 11th, there 
was a need to review as many videotapes as possible to see who 
may have been associated with the attack.  Had there been a rule 
requiring destruction after seventy-two hours we may have missed 
one of the best leads that is available to us. 
So I think that is part of this balance and part of this need, 
because I think that may educate people more as to why keeping 
them longer may be appropriate.  The issue is how you keep and 
use that information.  But certainly, seventy-two hours, I think, is 
an arbitrary cutoff that could cut off some investigative value. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: I see several people in the audience, 
but if I could just sharpen the question ever so slightly, I would 
recall that the topic for the panel is legal issues involving security, 
and I would put this question to Norman Siegel in the first 
instance: 
Insofar as you are raising questions about whether somebody 
has a right not to have his or her image captured and to have that 
image retained, are you using the word “right” in the legal sense, 
that there is some legal prohibition against the capturing and 
retention of that image; or are you using the term “right” in the a 
 
107 Id. 
108  This is a reference to the accumulation of information and surveillance of individual 
citizens by the political party Big Brother, which controls the government in the novel 
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policy-based, moral sense, indicating only that you would prefer 
that this were not done and that you think it would not be done in a 
better society? 
MR. SIEGEL: Your question shows that you are not only a 
good moderator, but a good lawyer.  But it also shows, without 
sounding arrogant, when I said in my opening, “if I may add the 
word policy issues,” I was being a good lawyer as well. 
I think that these are frontier issues.  For example, when I make 
the argument about anonymity, as opposed to privacy, if we were 
debating, Mr. Ahlerich and I, I would probably have to concede 
that my case for privacy argument was not so strong based on case 
law at this point.
109 
But anonymity is a concept, as I explained before, that I think 
in due time will be used if in fact the surveillance technology is 
used as I think it is going to be used.  And then, if we came back 
five years from now, I might be able to answer that question. 
If you are asking me if I am prepared at this point to make the 
legal argument in this forum today, sure.  If you are asking me if I 
am prepared to go before nine Supreme Court Justices and make 
that argument tomorrow, I probably would not take that case 
tomorrow. But I might take it in a year or two. 
It all interacts in our judicial system, and judges are human 
beings too.  In fact, they might be going to ballparks as well—I 
would hope some of them go to ballparks.  In the context of that, 
what you do is you develop new theories, new concepts, in the 
court of public opinion. And, once there is a receptivity and 
acceptance of the concept, you are then prepared to test it in the 
court of law.  I think in due time these issues will arise. 
If you do not like seventy-two hours, buy into the concept and 
we can negotiate, maybe ninety-six hours. 
No, more seriously, the bottom line is that when we were in the 
fight about crime in the streets, we would always say that if you 
wanted to put a checkpoint on every street corner in America with 
a video surveillance camera on every lamp post in America, I 
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guarantee you we could drastically reduce the street crime issue, 
but in going that route we would not be America anymore.
 
It is the same point here.  You could put a video surveillance 
camera in every section in every sports facility and you could use 
facial recognition, you could keep that information in perpetuity 
and you could have DNA samples every time someone is born in 
America, and you will probably have a better chance of 
apprehending criminals and terrorists, but then we are not America 
anymore. 
If you are serious about the balance—and I am sure you are, 
but the problem is whether other people are—when you do the 
balance, you have to take into account the freedom principles and 
values, in addition to the security.  When people continue, as 
political people do, to tell us that we have to choose one or 
another, or I get up and I read we have to give up fifteen percent of 
our freedom in order to get six percent safety, I reject that notion.  
It is simplistic, it is unrealistic, and it is manipulative to the 
American public. 
MR. SQUIRES: We have a closed-circuit TV camera system at 
Giants Stadium.  On a game day we are 80,000 people strong,
110 
we are the tenth largest city in New Jersey,
111 on approximately 
twelve acres.  Think about that, 80,000 people on twelve acres. 
Our job is to make sure that everybody enjoys themselves.  Our 
cameras are not used to violate anybody’s privacy.  The people 
who behave themselves we do not even see.  The cameras are for 
the people who misbehave; we capture their images, and if we 
have to go to court, we use that.
 
 
110 See,  e.g., Leonard Shapiro, Bryant, Barber Send Giants Into Postseason, WASH. 
POST., Dec. 29, 2002 (estimating attendance at the December 29th game (New York 
Giants game against the Philadelphia Eagles) to be greater than 78,782).
 
111  N.J. Dep’t of Labor, Table 6: Population for the 15 Largest Counties, Cities and 
Townships in New Jersey  (1999–2000),  available at http://www.wnjpin.net/ 
OneStopCareerCenter/LaborMarketInformation/lmi25/pl94/nj_tab_6.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2003) (citing 2000 New Jersey State Census data listing the ninth largest New 
Jersey city, Trenton, with a population of 85,403 and the tenth largest city, Camden, with 
a population of 79,904).
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Our tapes are re-recorded every twenty-four hours, so we do 
not even have the ability, if we do not have an incident then, to go 
back to it. 
So it is used more for the protection and the enjoyment of our 
guests than anything else. 
Now, it is funny, this facial recognition system.  I just had a 
brief on it this past week.  My question to the guys was, “How 
accurate is it?”  They said, “About fifty percent.”
112  I said, “Well, 
that is certainly not good enough.” 
You know, we have to remember—and I think Paul put it best 
when he said that—you know, I said before, our security should be 
like a good boxing referee.  We are there to help.  We want you to 
enjoy the event.  When we start providing so much security that 
people cannot enjoy the event, they are not going to go anymore.  
So you have to temper safety with everything else. 
Thank you. 
MR. SIEGEL: Could you use the word “freedom?” 
MR. SQUIRES: Listen, I spent twenty-six years of my life 
defending the freedom of this country, so I do not even want to get 
into that debate. 
QUESTIONER: Is there not a legal difference between your 
right to anonymity walking down the street or walking into Central 
Park versus going to a stadium where you already have to pay a 
price to get in, and in some cases many people cannot afford the 
price to get in?  It seems to me they are two different situations. 
MR. SIEGEL: I still think there is anonymity in a sports 
facility.  Why should anybody know where you go and with 
whom?  You could have all kinds of scenarios where you do not 
want anyone to know who you are going with, from political to 
social associations. 
Hearing what Bill Squires said and how Giants Stadium uses 
their surveillance is encouraging.  He is saying that within twenty-
four hours it automatically erases it.  They will know during the 
 
112 See Mike Bone et al., Evaluating Facial Recognition Technology for Drug Control 
Applications, ONDCP International Counterdrug Technology Symposium, June 26–28, 
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course of that afternoon whether there were any criminal activities 
taking place there, as a general proposition.  There could be some 
instances where in fact you will not know until later on, so that is 
why I suggested seventy-two hours. 
But the balance is you are going to lose some of that, in the 
sense that if we agreed on a week, for example, where someone did 
not make a complaint until two weeks later, but that probably will 
be aberrational, not general.  In that context, you weigh losing that 
identification evidence with the fact that you do not have the 
database possibilities, which is antithetical to a democratic society 
as a general proposition. 
But to your question, if I am in Shea Stadium and am law-
abiding, I am not sure that people have a right to know that I am 
there. 
MR. ZOUBEK: It would depend on the ownership of that 
particular facility.  Is it a public facility?  Is it a privately owned 
facility? 
There are the rights of a private property owner.
113  If I wanted 
to put a camera in every corner of my home, I certainly could do 
so, and it would certainly be my right to do so.
114  In the balance of 
working with spectators, if you identify that is what you are doing, 
that you are coming into our home, you may enjoy yourself 
because we provide entertainment for you while you are in our 
home, but these are our rules while you are in our home.  The 
owner’s control is stronger to the extent to which it is a private 
facility.
115 
MR. SIEGEL: Right.  But that could change, too, if the state 
legislature or Congress decided to legislate and to regulate video 
surveillance cameras. 
It is interesting.  Video surveillance cameras, in general, are 
popping up all over America.  In December 1998, I did a study just 
 
113  G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (“Business premises 
invite lesser privacy expectations.”). 
114 Id. See also Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(dismissing invasion of privacy claim arising from employers surveillance of employees 
in work areas). 
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in Manhattan, and there were 2,400 video surveillance cameras.
116  
It was not Orwellian because eighty-nine percent of them were 
privately owned.
117  But all of those cameras—that is almost three 
and a half years ago—were in place without a single public 
hearing, without a single public debate with regard to the pros and 
cons of video surveillance technology. 
You could develop a piece of legislation that would alter what 
you just said.  And I think that the proponents of video surveillance 
cameras, including the ballparks, have to come to understand that 
as they move in this direction, if they do it in an insensitive way 
and not a balanced manner, I would predict that that legislation 
will become more of a possibility. 
QUESTIONER: Regarding the facial recognition system, Bill, 
I do not know which one you looked at, because there are many of 
them out there and they work on different principles. 
The one that I am familiar with that works the best actually 
takes a video and converts it to an algorithm of the face.
118  Once 
that is done, the video itself is discarded as useless.
119  So when 
you go panning through a crowd, what it does is match the 
database against another algorithm to form that match. So you are 
really not looking at faces, you are looking at a mathematical 
formula, which provides a lot more protection.  And it does have 
intelligence built into it so that, with weight gains and facial hair 
and the like, it does actually learn and adjust those records.
120  So 
somebody who is not in a system that you are comparing it to, you 
would have no idea who these people are in any case.  You can use 
 
116 See Norman Siegel, Beware of Video Surveillance Cameras, New York Civil 
Liberties Union, at http://www.nyclu.org/siegel/siegel7.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003); 
NYCLU Surveillance Camera Project, http://www.nyclu.org/surveillance.html (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2003).  Maps identifying camera locations in Manhattan can be found at 
http://www.mediaeater.com/cameras/maps/nyc.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
117 O RWELL, supra note 99 (In 1984, all surveillance was conducted by the government 
in an attempt to control citizens’ thoughts and actions.) 
118 See,  e.g., Dep’t of Defense Counterdrug Technology Development Program Office, 
FERET: Overview,  at  http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/facialrecognition/Feret/feret.htm 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2003). 
119 Id. 
120 See RAND, Super Bowl Surveillance: Big Brother or Beneficial Technology?, at 
http://www.rand.org/natsec_area/products/ip_biometrics.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
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the video after the fact to send it in to then have it scanned through 
a system.  But it really does provide a lot of privacy as long as you 
are not in anyone’s system. 
MR. SIEGEL: When you say “system,” do you mean criminal 
database? 
QUESTIONER: Yes. 
MR. SIEGEL: Just—and maybe you can comment also—the 
other part when I talk about implementation, whatever did happen 
at the Super Bowl, the database was incredibly narrow.  The idea 
was looking for terrorists—it turned out what they were looking 
for was pickpockets or ticket scalpers.
121 
QUESTIONER: Right.  It goes back to garbage-in/garbage-out.  
It has to be matched up to the appropriate source. 
MR. SIEGEL: Well, but, more importantly, it is connected to 
false security.  What I am saying is that some of this is inviting 
theory, but what is in place does not match the theory.  Therefore, 
the American public could be misled into thinking that this new 
technology is making you safer when in fact it is not doing that.  If 
we are going to be serious and realistic about this, which I think we 
are all committed to, we should not be setting technology in 
motion that gives a false sense of security. 
MR. AHLERICH: That is mostly correct in terms of what was 
in the database in Tampa, but also the image of Eric Robert 
Rudolph, who had been charged with the bombing in Atlanta, and 
his associates were in the database also, which we thought was 
completely relevant to protecting the event. 
 
121 See,  e.g., ACLU, Q&A on Facial Recognition Technology, ACLU Archives, at 
http://archive.aclu.org/issues/privacy/facial_recognition_faq.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2003). 
A second use of the [facial recognition] technology was at the 2001 Super 
Bowl in Tampa, where pictures were taken of every attendee as they entered 
the stadium through the turnstiles and compared against a database of some 
undisclosed kind.  The authorities would not say who was in that database, but 
the software did flag [nineteen] individuals.  The police indicated that some of 
those were false alarms, and no one flagged by the system was anything more 
than a petty criminal such as a ticket scalper. 
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QUESTIONER: Just one more, commenting on the ticketing 
issue.  In most cases in sporting events now, there is a very small 
percentage that actually pays cash for a ticket in advance or at the 
gate.  So in almost every instance when you do have a problem at a 
sporting event, you can trace back the origin of who purchased the 
ticket in any case.  So it is a very, very tiny number of people who 
are anonymous. 
MR. SQUIRES: Just to address the facial recognition, we did 
not solicit the presentation, the presentation came to us.  But the 
technology that they use is measuring the pixels between the two 
eyes.  They have shown where—this presentation was impressive, 
but, like I said, fifty percent accurate is not going to happen for us. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: In some ways, in comparison with 
what I would have expected coming in, the conversation here has 
been remarkably sanguine.  What I mean by “remarkably 
sanguine” is this: everybody agrees that we have to have a balance 
between protection of security on the one hand and protection of 
liberties and anonymity and so forth on the other hand.  Everybody 
seems to agree that what is for the most part being done now seems 
to be sensible and adequate with respect to protecting security.  I 
do not hear anybody here on the panel advocating that dramatic 
new steps be taken. 
Norman Siegel objects to some use of video surveillance 
cameras, but his principal objections, apart from that, have been 
levied at things that might be done in the future but that have not 
been done yet. 
And so, as I say, I get some sense everybody up here is 
relatively content with the way that the world is today. 
So here is my question: As somebody who goes to sporting 
events and is concerned about my security when I go there, how 
sanguine ought I to feel?  How great is the threat to me when I go 
to a sporting event, or to somebody who goes to a sporting event at 
Giants Stadium, and what else might be done to deal with that 
threat?  Indeed, what likely would be done if, God forbid, there 
were a successful terrorist attack on a sports facility somewhere in 
the country?  What would happen next? 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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MR. SIEGEL: Before anyone answers, I just want to comment.  
I am not as sanguine as you think I am.  It is early Friday morning. 
I do not know enough about what is actually taking place.  As a 
civil libertarian, I believe in fairness.  I will not make accusations 
unless I have evidence.  What I have done here this morning is lay 
out my conceptual objections and concerns to certain technology. 
For example, I came in prepared to be critical of the 2001 
Tampa Super Bowl, and then Mr. Ahlerich told me outside certain 
things that I had not known before. 
I am laying the groundwork.  If in fact—and it is very possible 
that history proves this—we find out after the fact that some of 
these things are currently taking place, you will hear me yelling 
and screaming.  But at this point I do not have that information. 
Everyone here has said, for example, on racial profiling they 
are against it.  Well, that is good to hear.  But I also made the 
comment that everybody says that.  And if, in fact, it is taking 
place, or did take place, there could be some challenges to that.  
We do not have that evidence at this moment.  I just wanted to 
qualify that for the record. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Right.  Okay. 
So to other members of the panel as well, how safe are we 
today?  What could be done to make us safer?  What would be 
done next to make us safer if we had some reason to think that the 
threat was greater than we apparently take it to be today? 
MR. ZOUBEK: I think one of the issues that we have had, both 
in government and in terms of the operation of facilities, is: What 
is the threat and how does it get communicated? 
One of the greatest difficulties is that we know that there is a 
generalized threat, but we do not have any specific information as 
to where a strike might occur.  So what we are engaged in is a 
generalized target hardening, identifying where the vulnerabilities 
might be, and trying to make it as safe as possible for people to 
decide that they will continue to go to sporting events. 
As I was going back and preparing for these remarks, I saw a 
very chilling Security Management article from 2000 that had 
focused on whether all other tall office towers were doing the same 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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“great job” with security that the World Trade Center was as a 
result of its $60 million ‘Gold Trophy’ security efforts in the wake 
of the 1993 World Trade Center attack?”
122 
The first thing I heard on September 11th was “a plane has 
gone into the World Trade Center.”  I heard that from the Chief of 
the Port Authority Police.  I thought it was a small plane.  That 
specific threat was not in my realm of thinking, or many people’s 
realm of thinking. 
Because we do not know what may happen next, we do not 
know where it may happen next, what we do is identify 
vulnerabilities and attempt to try take reasonable security efforts.  
We cannot make guarantees as to what is going to happen next, 
that is a very difficult thing.  I think we have done everything that 
we reasonably can to identify the vulnerabilities, but I think we 
constantly have to be gathering intelligence.  And sporting 
facilities—I am sure Milton, with his background—a lot of 
facilities have hooked up with the local law enforcement 
authorities, with the increased intelligence efforts that we have to 
engage in, so we know a little bit more about the threats. 
The problem is we are really in a stage right now where we 
have a generalized threat that we are not fully able to evaluate. 
MR. SQUIRES: I think if we were to do any more at Giants 
Stadium it would disrupt the enjoyment. 
The only other thing I could think that we are not doing is 
checking every car that comes through the toll plazas.  I think if 
you have ever been out there—27,500 cars, 32,000 on a Monday 
night—that is virtually impossible for us to do and it would disrupt 
the enjoyment of the game. 
So we feel pretty comfortable that we are going to take 
probably all steps—I do not think we could take any more, to be 
honest with you. 
 
122  Michael A. Gips, Building in Terrorism’s Shadow, Security Managment Online, 
http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/000852.html (May 2000) (“In the last seven 
years, the World Trade Center spent $60 million in capital funds to counter this [terrorist] 
threat, setting the gold standard for trophy building security.”).
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MR. AHLERICH: For our events we used a sliding scale, with 
the idea that the games in the post-season, the ten post-season 
games including Super Bowl, were higher risk, higher threat, again 
to generalize.  We received very few specific threats that were 
vetted through law enforcement that had a terrorist sense to them 
during the year—two or three that proved to be not valid, which 
we worked very, very hard in advance of games. 
The amount of security went up for our post-season games, 
with additional measures being taken in each one of the stadiums, 
security reviews and additional measures being taken, with the 
culmination being the Super Bowl, where we went to the next step, 
to a complete hardened perimeter all the way around the Super 
Dome and magnetometers and pat-down searches,
123 which are 
done at a few stadiums but not very many.  Again, these were 
consent searches across the board, with full signage and full 
notification to all fans.  We had complete cooperation from our 
fans at Super Bowl. 
QUESTIONER: As a lawyer/sports-fan/civil libertarian, I want 
to give you an observation, an anecdote, and a hypothetical. 
The observation is that at Shea Stadium we are right in the 
flight path.
124  On a Saturday afternoon, there have to be eight-to-
ten planes that fly directly over Shea Stadium.  We are all 
expecting one of these days for one of those planes to just fall into 
Shea Stadium.  Why that has not been made into a constant no-
flight zone is beyond me. 
The anecdote is, as a New Yorker and a sports fan, I know that 
I can sit anywhere I want in Shea Stadium.  You just talk to the 
guards and you make your private arrangements. 
I went in there one day and all my friends were gone.  I went 
over to one of the people that I knew and said, “Where is So-and-
So or So-and-So?” 
“They have all been fired.” 
 
123 Mary  Foster,  Super Bowl Security No Leisurely Stroll for NFL,  at http://www. 
globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020128-attack01.htm (Jan. 28, 2002). 
124 Shea  Stadium, at http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/national/sheast.htm (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2003) (“Shea Stadium is the noisiest outdoor ballpark in the majors because it is 
in the flight path of La Guardia Airport.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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I said, “What happened?” 
He said, “They were all taking bribes and they were caught on 
videotape,”—and they were—and they were all fired with no 
appeal.  They are all back, by the way. 
[Laughter.] 
MR. SIEGEL: They did not need an appeal, then. 
QUESTIONER: The hypothetical is: I am accustomed to being 
searched, I am accustomed to taking my belt off, I am accustomed 
to taking my shoes off, to going through metal detectors, because 
President Clinton has been there or John Rocker has been there, we 
have had surveillance in that stadium up the wazoo.  But what 
would happen if I walked through the gate and some facial 
recognition system said, “Stop him, he’s the one.”  How do I rebut 
that?  How do I get into the game?  And let’s say that it is a World 
Series game and I have paid $1,000 for a ticket.  What happens 
then?  And what happens if I cannot get into the game and the 
stadium is wrong? 
MR. SIEGEL: Well, you would have a cause of action. 
But putting that aside, I think that is exactly the point.  It is one 
of the reasons why, knowing what I know about facial recognition 
software technology, I would strongly recommend that it not be 
employed at this point. 
I would leave the door open if the technology changed.  But as 
of this point, with this season coming up for baseball, for example, 
at Shea, they would be making a huge mistake to go in that 
direction and use that facial recognition.  And there is a good 
chance, a little more than forty percent, that your hypothetical 
would actually happen. 
MR. AHLERICH: I sit on a committee with the International 
Association of Assembly Managers for Security that is developing 
a set of Best Practices for a much larger scope in terms of venues, 
and nowhere is facial recognition technology being seriously 
considered, that I know of, certainly not by this task force, this 
committee.
125  I mean, we are talking about it a lot, I think it is 
 
125  The International Association of Assembly Managers [IAAM] is an organization 
designed to provide leadership and education for those who manage and serve public 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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good that we talk about it a lot, but it is not being used, and for the 
exact reasons that we have discussed here.  The technology is 
premature and there are some privacy issues. 
But let’s not throw it out.  As you say, keep it open; let’s keep 
it open.  But let’s debate it, as we are, which I think is appropriate. 
It is not being used, and I do not think it is going to be used 
right away, from what I hear from the professionals. 
MR. SQUIRES: I would hope that if you are paying $1,000 for 
a ticket that the Yankees are playing the Mets in the World Series. 
MR. SIEGEL: If it did happen, I will give you my cell phone 
number, because I will be at Shea this October, and I will come out 
and get you in. 
MR. ZOUBEK: It is going to depend on the circumstances of 
whether or not it is part of the generalized security enhancement 
that the stadium is engaged in and you will have to balance 
competing interests at the time—privacy versus security.  Where 
there is a specific threat to a facility, then the public, the fans, 
everyone is going to have the expectation that we are doing more, 
and then you are going to have to evaluate the competing interests 
of privacy versus security. 
I agree with Bill that if the devices you are seeing are only fifty 
percent accurate, then you are not into a zone where you are even 
considering using it.  But if there was a compelling need at that 
time, in terms of the security threat, that would give the facility, I 
think, a different base of argument, depending upon the technology 
at the time. 
MR. SIEGEL: Opening day for Yankee Stadium, because 
President Bush was there, there was a different kind of security 
 
assembly facilities.  See http://www.iaam.org (n.d.).  The IAAM’s Safety and Security 
Task Force was established to review and recommend security guidelines for venue 
manager.  See Press Release, IAAM, IAAM Safety and Security Task Force, Record 
Numbers Attend International Association of Assembly Managers’ Conference on Patron 
Safety and Security Preparedness at Public Venues (Nov. 21, 2001), 
http://www.iaam.org/Industry_News/icmc.htm. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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system than the remaining games.
126  But it then raised the issue 
of: Is that going to happen at every game?  Even if they are playing 
the Kansas City Royals and nobody is there, will that technology 
be used? 
These are issues that we have to keep our eyes on, and I think 
we have to raise our civil libertarian concerns and objections so 
that the folks here are not making decisions in a vacuum. 
You would be surprised—and I hope it does not come out too 
corny—that the objections, if they are presented in a reasonable 
fashion, sometimes the decision makers actually listen and they 
hold back. 
But I would hope that when you are doing these task forces you 
put civil rights people on those panels so that you do not have the 
divisiveness that these issues could create.  Have them in the room, 
and then make a conscious decision, as opposed to making the 
decision afterwards.  And I think, unless you tell me otherwise, 
very often they do not do that, and I think it is a mistake. 
QUESTIONER: Well, since we are back at law school, I feel I 
want to ask this hypothetical to the panel.  Let us assume it is five 
or six years into the future.  Facial recognition technology is now 
ninety-eight percent accurate.  It is linked with local criminal 
databases, the FBI database, potentially working with Immigration 
and the DMVs around the country, in order to get a very sure 
match on your face.  Also buffer that against the fact that 
September 11th has taken place and along the way during these 
five years we have defeated potential terrorist threats in the United 
States where they have been caught before they were able to 
accomplish their mission. 
I would like to open it up to the panel to see what they think 
about using this technology that now has been more perfected in 
the future at sporting events, which are probably one of the best 
targets for these terrorists. 
 
126 Strike One: President Bush Throws Out Ceremonial First Pitch, CNN/Sports 
Illustrated,  at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/2001/worldseries/news/2001/ 
10/30/bush_ap (Oct. 30, 2001).
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MR. SIEGEL: Would you add into the hypothetical that if in 
fact the digitized facial—whatever the technical word is—the 
picture of the person, that if you are not in the database, it is 
immediately destroyed? 
QUESTIONER: I would say that most people are in the DMV.  
I am saying that every time you take a picture with the 
government, you are recorded somewhere, obviously, and that you 
can use that database through a broadband access to immediately 
get a match on that person. 
MR. SQUIRES: I think the database that we are looking at is 
not the 275 million people across the United States.  It is more of 
those who may have some sort of a record or may be more of a 
threat to the stadium.
127 
Now, I do not think we would ever look at jaywalkers, but 
maybe scalpers certainly, maybe people who we have ejected from 
the facility who cannot return without permission, those kind of 
things. 
But I would have to say this: I mean, who would have thought 
twenty years ago that we would be implementing the security 
procedures we have now?  I think we need to stay in touch with 
what is going on and at least evaluate it and look at it. 
MR. SIEGEL: I would be opposed to that in the way you 
described it.  It is just overly broad; it dragnets in a large, large 
percentage of innocent people.  I would be opposed to that. 
The harder question is if you created a criminal database with a 
much more narrow scope and if you were able to have the 
technology so that if Siegel walked through, and assuming in six 
years I am still the law-abiding person I am now, that they do not 
have that kind of capacity to keep my photo.  That is a harder 
hypothetical. 
But the way you framed it, I am opposed to that. 
QUESTIONER: Well, I am just saying the reason it is linked 
with these databases is that terrorists—and I have been following 
the case very diligently for my own reasons—all these people were 
 
127 See John D. Woodward, Jr., Super Bowl 2001—The Game Was the Least Interesting 
Part, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at B4. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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able to get into the country, develop an identification through their 
local DMVs, and go around as people, and no one suspected them.  
They were the most law-abiding people that you could see.  They 
were the people who lived next door.  Terrorists do not wear big 
signs on their heads saying “I am a terrorist” and they do not try to 
commit acts of criminality until the very end. 
MR. SIEGEL: You get a picture and you then know that 
somebody has a driver’s license.  So what does that tell you? 
QUESTIONER: All I am saying is that the reason I framed the 
hypothetical that way is because of these people—to make the 
database wider to try to catch them and to try to keep them 
recorded. 
MR. AHLERICH: But they would have to be wanted.  They 
would have to be identified as a terrorist.  The people who were 
here were not wanted.  They were here illegally, but they were not 
tagged, if you will.
128  So even if you would have captured their 
images, they would not have been stopped. 
MR. SIEGEL: All drivers are not terrorists. 
MR. ZOUBEK: Let me ask, to follow back on, Professor, your 
comment in terms of the legal issue here: What if I have a stadium 
owner who says, “You know, I love my fans so much, I would 
really just like to have a picture of all of the sections from each of 
the games and I want to have a photo album over here of all my 
happy fans over the years?” 
MR. SIEGEL: Get consent.  That is not hard. 
MR. ZOUBEK: What has he violated?  What has he done that 
is illegal?  What has he done that you can sue him for under 
current law that he has violated? 
 
128 See,  e.g., Karen Alexander, Airport to Get Facial Recognition Technology, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, § 2, at 1. 
The way the new [facial recognition] technology is going to be deployed . . . 
would have been useless in stopping Mohamed Atta, the suspected ringleader 
of the Sept. 11 terrorist hijackings.  Unless he had been arrested, he would not 
have been scanned.  And since Atta is not believed to have had a criminal 
record . . . his face would not have produced a match. 
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It is no different than advising a client in any other line of 
business as it relates to the duty of care of their participants and 
their spectators. 
One of the notions that I think is important to keep in mind is 
that to the extent to which there are Best Practices developed in 
your industry, if your client is not abiding by those Best Practices, 
that will be Exhibit 1 in any litigation. 
So your client must remain current as much as possible with 
security developments in their line of the sports business, whether 
it related to obligations to individual player clients, whether it is 
obligations for stadiums operators or event organizers.  I do not 
think the analysis is really going to be much different than in many 
other fields of law. 
But there are other issues for sports lawyers, such as union 
relations when criminal background checks are done for security 
purposes.
129  Also, how prepared are your employees to respond to 
an incident.  As first responders, what protection have you 
provided for them should something happen in the facility?  Those 
are some of the issues affecting the day-to-day operation of a 
facility or a sporting business. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: In terms of suits under current law, I 
want to ask a question that maybe cuts a little bit the other way 
from the thread of the discussion as it has developed so far. 
We have here an enormously effective lawyer advocate in 
Norman Siegel, who has focused the conversation to a very 
considerable extent on the kinds of issues that a civil liberties 
lawyer would raise in response to increased surveillance and other 
efforts to protect security.  But not all effective lawyers are civil 
liberties lawyers.  There are a lot of very effective lawyers who are 
plaintiffs’ tort lawyers.  If there were some kind of a disaster at a 
facility, you can be sure that those plaintiffs’ tort lawyers would be 
eager to jump into the fray, filing lawsuits claiming that what had 
 
129  To institute a policy of criminal background checks on employees represented by a 
union and covered by a collective bargaining agreement, an employer will have an 
obligation to bargain with the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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been done to protect security would not satisfy the duty of 
reasonable care that any facility owner or manager bears.
130 
So is that not relevant to the question about what facilities 
would have to do with developing technologies, the duty of 
reasonable care?  Would we not have to worry about that as well? 
And then, as a related question, I am curious, for those of you 
actually in the business of making decisions and counseling clients, 
to what extent are you talking to them about legal issues, possible 
legal liability, and duties of reasonable care, going beyond what 
would be the sensible thing to do from a business perspective 
anyway? 
MR. SIEGEL: Your question is a good one. 
There is a flip concern that I have.  That is, for example, in 
private buildings you see more and more surveillance cameras.  I 
had a conversation once with an attorney who represented a co-op, 
and he argued, “Well, there is no crime in the building, but it has 
become the standard now that you have to have them.”  Once you 
go down that slippery slope, you are going to have all these kinds 
of surveillance cameras in private buildings.  And why are they 
there?  Well, because the Jones’s had it, and therefore that 
becomes the standard. 
And generally in advising clients, lawyers want to give them 
all their deliberative thoughts and say, “It would be better for you 
to do this.”  And then, lo and behold, in a short period of time, 
every building has a video surveillance network.  So that is what 
we could be going into. 
MR. AHLERICH: I just want to comment briefly on the 
thinking that we had as we developed the Best Practices. 
One of our attorneys in the initial stage of the discussion said, 
“You are creating a very, very dangerous set of documents.”  That 
argument ultimately did not win out.  Ultimately the argument that 
we had the responsibility to provide care and some sort of even-
handed protection to our fans to the best of our ability and urge the 
stadium to do that was our larger responsibility and the right thing 
 
130 See  supra  note 70 and accompanying text. 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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to do.  But it was debated rigorously among our attorneys and 
those of us in the process of protecting our fans. 
MR. SQUIRES: That being said, Milt, those Best Practices, 
when they were given to the teams and to the facility managers, 
there was nothing that said, “You must do this, you must do that.”  
Everything was recommended, and all the recommendations were 
pretty darn good. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Let me just pick up, for example, on 
the issue of metal detectors in Best Practices.  If you use metal 
detectors for some events—the Super Bowl, or use metal detectors 
if the President is coming to Yankee Stadium—then presumably 
you could use metal detectors for all events.  If you are not using 
metal detectors for all events when you use them for some events, 
are you living up to a standard of reasonable care? 
MR. AHLERICH: We think ultimately it is up to the facility 
whether they use it or not, or those in charge of the event.  And the 
use of metal detectors has to be reasonably balanced on the threat 
that you have.  At Super Bowl, we believed that the threat was 
very high.
131  We believed that, as the icon of sporting events, that 
it necessarily provided a very attractive target to terrorists.
132 
I heard a comment earlier about the use of metal detectors and 
how effective were they, whether or not they were a good idea.  I 
would suggest that they do a lot of good.  And we know they do a 
lot of good, because where you use them you find guns and knives 
in the bushes outside of the locations where they have been 
employed. 
We are not making it an absolute standard across the board.  
They are being used in some stadiums, very few.  They are being 
used randomly in more stadiums.  And I think we will certainly 
continue to use them at our premier events. 
MR. SQUIRES: If I could add real quickly, in twenty-six years 
at Giants Stadium, we have used metal detectors twice, both by 
direction.  We did not volunteer to do it. 
 
131 Mark  Lepage,  Football? What Football?: Tomorrow, Many Millions of People Will 
Watch U2, Paul McCartney, Britney Spears—Oh, Yeah, and the Super Bowl Game, 
GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 2, 2002. 
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October 1995, when Pope John Paul II came, the Secret 
Service said, “You will use metal detectors.”  We had to open up 
the gates five hours prior to the Mass because it took that long to 
get people in.  That was understandable. 
The second time we had to use them was last summer for 
’NSync.  That is not understandable, not even for a second. 
I have a challenge with metal detectors.  I understand what Milt 
is saying.  Because of what we are doing at the gates, checking 
people, after games I have my ushers go through all the aisles.  For 
those of you who attend Giants games, do not give this secret out, 
but I actually go and look for cans.  Where I find empty cans, I put 
an undercover individual in that section next week to see if you are 
smuggling cans.  And then we take the appropriate action. 
We do not find cans anymore.  And it is not because we are 
doing such a good job at the checkpoint.  It is because people know 
we are searching. 
The same thing—we found knives and we found all kinds of 
things outside the gates in the trash cans.  It has been pretty 
incredible.  And as the season wore on, as people got used to it, we 
found less and less outside the gates. 
But the metal detectors—you know, I found in 1995 when the 
Pope came that the metal detectors are somewhat sensitive or 
insensitive.  It rained.  It affected the measurements and whether 
they worked or not.  But the most important thing is you’ve got a 
different staff coming and working—well, you try to keep 
consistent with your staff, but to train them in how to use them 
properly. 
At ’NSync—and I did not object to it at all—they were 
magging
133 the front of the people but not the back of the people, 
and I said to my people, “Well, you know, there are two sides to a 
person.”  If you are going to bring something in, you get it in one 
way or the other. 
 
133  Security personnel use the term “magging” to refer to the process of using hand-held 
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So I am not sold on the metal detectors yet, and I think it will 
be a while—I mean a long while—before you see them in our 
place. 
MR. SIEGEL: I do not know the answer to the following 
question, but I will raise it.  Again, in view of what we do know 
what happened at Logan Airport on September 11th, if you had an 
event that you really wanted to be absolutely sure that there was 
going to be no terrorist attack, I am not sure the reasonable thing to 
do is to just rely on a metal detector.
 134  There is actual 
technology—the X-ray concept that I think customs has; some 
places have it, I have heard—but it is very expensive, and as a 
result it is not being used.
135 
But if you had hypothetically a threat, which does not exist 
here today, that there would be a terrorist who would be so upset 
by what the other gentlemen are saying here today that they would 
want to come and engage in some terrorism and take everyone out, 
if you put a metal detector up at this door, the terrorists know, as 
we know from September 11th, that they do not need to bring any 
metal.
136  So they bring a plastic device in here. 
So if you were really concerned about protecting everybody 
and you were going to put a metal detector out there, should you 
not then elevate the technology for X-ray equipment that would 
detect stuff like plastic explosives? 
 
134  Two of the four planes involved in the September 11th attacks departed from 
Boston’s Logan Airport.  It is believed that the terrorists utilized box cutters and plastic 
knives to hijack the planes, weapons which got past the metal detector security checks at 
the airport terminal.  Following the attacks, airports have begun to supplement metal 
detectors with additional security measures.  See infra note 136 and accompanying text.  
See, e.g., Jeff Jacobs, City Finds New Perspective, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Sept. 
19, 2001, at C1. 
135 See Sara Kehaulaiani Goo, Large, Small Airports to Use Different Security Systems, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at A5; A New Line at the Airport, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Conn.), Jan. 2, 2003, at A8; Port Officials: We Need More Money for Security, News 
Max,  at  http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/1/29/104432.shtml (Jan. 29, 
2002). 
136 Peter  Mansbridge,  Attack on America, National Transcripts, at http://www.tv.cbc.ca/ 
national/trans/T010912.html (Sept. 12, 2001) (“Each plane has three to six highjackers on 
board armed with box cutters and plastic knives.”). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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I know most people are shocked when I raise that because the 
stereotype of the civil liberties lawyer is that we do not want 
anything.  But that is not true. 
MR. AHLERICH: That is why we also employed the pat-
down, because we were concerned about individuals bringing in 
large amounts of C4 plastic strapped to their bodies.  It has not 
been done in this country, but certainly that has been used 
elsewhere.
137 
MR. SIEGEL: The pat-down is more clearly non-
individualized suspicion and more intrusive than walking through a 
door that has some X-ray capacity that a light goes on and then you 
have the individualized suspicion.  The courts have not recognized 
this, unfortunately from my perspective, from airport searches, 
from searches in courthouses. I have been involved in some 
litigation on that going back thirty years. 
And also, quite frankly, as the panelists have pointed out, the 
public is not receptive to these “lawyer arguments.”  And so, as a 
result, those transgressions continue and grow. 
MR. ZOUBEK: I met days after September 11th with the 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in New Jersey
138 to 
discuss the response to September 11th and one of the first 
questions I got was: “What are you doing to keep us safe?”  We 
then engaged in a discussion of recent detentions and the difficult 
issues concerning tracking Al-Qaeda after the attacks.  We 
discussed that some of those decisions on who was associated with 
Al-Qaeda may end in court. 
 
137 S ee Terrorism: Mechanics of a Living Bomb, War Online, at http://www.waronline. 
org/en/terror/suicide.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
138 See  Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers of N.J., Welcome, at http://www.acdlnj.org (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2003). 
The Association was established in 1985  .  .  .  to respond to the continuing 
problems confronting criminal defense lawyers when they honestly, ethically, 
but zealously represent their clients; to protect and insure compliance with 
those individual rights guaranteed by the New Jersey and United States 
Constitutions; and to encourage cooperation among criminal defense lawyers 
engaged in the furtherance of those objectives. 
Id.
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But certainly, those who are responsible for security are going 
to take those measures that protect the public.  Some of the 
measures may be subject to negotiation such as seventy-two hours 
versus a week on the tapes but some decisions will have to be 
made quickly based upon a compelling need.  I hope we have the 
courage to make those difficult decisions, and some of those 
decisions will be challenged and litigated. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Let me play the cynic here just for a 
minute. 
When I hear the discussion about metal detectors, I hear 
Norman Siegel raise civil liberties objections, but, frankly, it is not 
one that resonates terribly much with me.  It does not seem to me 
to be a big deal to walk through a metal detector.  There are lots of 
places where I have to do it in going about my life today. 
I said the question I was going to raise was a somewhat cynical 
question.  The discussion so far has been proceeding on the 
assumption that what we are trying to do is engage in some refined 
balance between security, on the one hand, and civil liberties, on 
the other.  Cynically, am I wrong to think that a big reason that we 
do not have metal detectors is just, from the perspective of the 
industry, it is too expensive? 
MR. SIEGEL: I think that is right. 
MR. ZOUBEK: Too expensive and impractical under certain 
circumstances, because if you have 40,000 people going into a 
stadium, in terms of backing them all up in long lines, it is a 
question of the current technology balanced against the risk. 
MR. AHLERICH: It is very difficult to have everyone trained 
and to have—these are expensive devices.  The better ones are 
very expensive.  And it is not a perfect technology. 
MR. SIEGEL: But the point that you were making, Professor 
Fallon, and I want to focus in on it and magnify it, is privacy is 
based on the expectation of privacy.  So by your own words, you 
have now become accustomed—I think that was the word that you 
used—to go into public facilities and to go through a metal 
detector, whether it is the courtroom, or whether it is the airport.  
That is a concern that civil libertarians have, that it is almost, by 
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to it, the right diminishes to the point that it does not exist 
anymore. 
The Fourth Amendment—I could make a strong argument that 
that is what has happened in the last twenty years.  There has been 
an erosion of Fourth Amendment expectations.
139  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
there are more searches and stops going on, frisks, than ever 
before, and people have become accustomed to it.
140 
The proponents of these kinds of what I consider transgressions 
of the Fourth Amendment have been very successful because the 
public now accepts it.  You will hear over and over again, “El Al
141 
is wonderful because they seal the cockpit prior to any passengers 
boarding the plane.  Why don’t we do that?”  One of the reasons 
we do not do some of these things is because it is not in our 
tradition. 
So the real question becomes: Five years from now are those 
traditions going to be radically changed because of things like 
September 11th? 
MR. ZOUBEK: I think that one of the things we have to keep 
in mind in terms of this balance is we have to recognize—and this 
does redefine, perhaps, the civil liberties debate in this country—is 
that we are talking about a threat that is based upon whether or not 
we have the right to exist as a nation. 
You review the Osama bin Laden tapes and he states “we hit 
her with the first hit and the next one we will hit her with the hands 
of the believers, the good believers, the strong believers.”   
Underlying this threat is the belief that our society with all that it 
stands for should not exist.
142 
 
139 See  Jennifer L. Malin, Comment, Veronica School District 47J Action: A Further 
Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 469, 486–518 (1996). 
140 See,  e.g., Kathleen Parker, If You’re Not Paranoid, You’re Not Paying Attention, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 20, 2002. 
141  El Al is the national airline of Israel. See David K. Li & Uri Dan, L.A. Airport 
Bloodbath: How Maniac Met His End Feds Tried to Boot Gunman, but Wife’s Visa Kept 
Him Here, N.Y. POST, July 7, 2002, at 8. 
142  Transcript of Osama bin Laden Videotape, CNN Transcrpits, at http://www.cnn. 
com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript (Dec. 13, 2001) (providing a translated transcript of a 
videotape of Osama bin Laden issued by the U.S. Department of Defense). 1 - PANEL I FORMAT 4/15/03  9:25 AM 
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That is why the public’s expectations are different now, that is 
why the balance is going to be different, and that is why I think 
some of the arguments that you may have been in a position to 
make in prior years are going to be more difficult to make. 
MR. SIEGEL: Possibly we will not make some of those 
arguments.  We are aware of that. 
QUESTIONER: I have two questions, and they are both related 
to what you are talking about. 
I have heard the negative arguments of what you are not 
looking to do, not looking to racial profile.  That sounds very good 
to me. 
The first question is: What are the affirmative routes for 
identifying the other-than-terrorist organizations—maybe militia 
groups, or criminal records from domestic violence crimes?  Are 
those routes from which you would be possibly pulling 
information? 
The second question is: Having taken an international flight 
and seeing increased security, where people were pulled aside and 
searched, the people pulling them aside and doing the searches are 
getting paid minimum wage, or maybe double minimum wage, 
$9.50 an hour.
143  So the two people who were searched most 
strongly were two very attractive, scantily clad women. In a 
society that pays the athletes themselves millions of dollars to 
perform, if we are paying the security personnel only $9.50 an 
hour, it is not giving them the due respect for the job that they have 
to do. 
How do you address training, support, and financing the people 
who have to take this responsibility so that they can perform on the 
level that we are expecting them to perform at? 
MR. SQUIRES: As far as training goes, the people who work 
at Giants Stadium—and I am just speaking for Giants Stadium—I 
think it is kind of like the people who work at Disney World, 
where I worked for three years.  People bought into that system.  
That is why they work there.  They enjoy working there.  I think 
 
143 See Brian O’Neill, Minimum Wage vs. Maximum Security, POST-GAZETTE 
(Pittsburgh), Sept. 20, 2001, at B-1.
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the people who work at Giants Stadium, I would say ninety-five 
percent of the people are happy. 
As a matter of fact, we polled our employees—we call them 
“team members”—and asked them, given all things, would they 
come back in 2002; and ninety-six percent of them responded 
“yes.”  So obviously, we are doing something right.  I do not think 
they are all there for the money. I really, really do not, because if 
they are, they must be in dire straits. 
But there are economics.  The one thing we can do for them—
and it costs—is train.  They have come out loud and clear in these 
surveys that we have done that they want training.  We conduct an 
evacuation drill every year.  It costs me a lot of money to bring in 
1,500 people an hour and a half earlier to train them.  But you 
know what?  You have to do it.  You cannot expect to put 
somebody in a uniform, put them out there and say, “Go figure out 
what you are supposed to do.”  So there is a serious investment 
there, but that is part of the deal.  That is just part of the deal. 
That is not saying everybody is getting all the training we want 
to give them, but it is certainly a step in the right direction. 
QUESTIONER: Hello.  I have a question for Mr. Ahlerich. 
I just came back from the Olympics,
144 and my experience 
there was people were very interested in being searched.  It was a 
very positive experience. 
And what I am wondering is: What is your organization doing 
to collaborate and share Best Practices back and forth, because the 
impact if any one of these types of sporting events is attacked 
could be devastating to the rest of the industry? 
MR. AHLERICH: Yes.  Certainly we have no say over how 
the NCAA or different universities run their events.  I am 
participating on a committee with the International Association of 
Assembly Managers.  I am sharing the Best Practices Guide with 
them. 
 
144  The 2002 Olympic Winter Games were held February 8, 2002, through February 24, 
2002, in Salt Lake City, Utah. See http://www.saltlake2002.com (last visited Mar. 25, 
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It is a confidential document, loosely—I mean, we are not 
putting it on the front page of the newspaper, but it is easily 
obtained by security professionals and stadium professionals.  If 
they want to see it, we are happy to share it with them. 
QUESTIONER: Mr. Squires, have the security searches 
resulted in any arrests for non-security violations—contraband, 
anything like that? 
MR. SQUIRES: No, they have not.  The only situation we did 
have—and it was not an arrest, it was an apprehension—was the 
individual who mentioned about the thermos, “Here, honey, take 
the bomb.” 
I will be honest with you.  You know, these people are leaving 
their things in their cars, they really are, or they are disposing of 
them in the trash cans outside the gates.  They have made our job 
very easy, and they have really bought into it. 
And we have done what Paul mentioned before.  We got the 
word out to the public through the media.  We sent flyers out with 
season tickets telling season ticket holders what is permitted and 
what is not permitted.  So, hopefully, we will not find anything. 
QUESTIONER: This question is addressed to Mr. Squires and 
also the NFL.  We have spent almost the entire time talking about 
electronic means.  One of the questioners talked about Shea 
Stadium which was built in the 1960s, and Giants Stadium is 
twenty-six years old.  I am curious as to what is being done 
architecturally to address the issues of security in these older 
buildings? 
MR. AHLERICH: For the older buildings, certainly the Best 
Practices Guide’s perimeter security is a very important element, 
and those are hard perimeters.  Mr. Squires is one of our biggest 
believers and best practitioners.  It was something that he was 
doing far in advance of Best Practices being announced. 
But it is a harder sell in other locations—”Why do we need 
Jersey barricades along the street?  Why do we need reinforced 
concrete flower pots, tree pots along the way?”  It is a part of the 
Best Practices Guide.  We urge even closing the streets at certain 
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Ultimately it is a recommendation and an urging, not a 
requirement, but more and more the bar is being moved in the 
direction that we are urging.  Mr. Squires is already doing it. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: Paul Zoubek has some expertise here 
too. 
MR. ZOUBEK: I think one of the things to keep in mind—and 
it cuts across all types of construction.  You are going to see an 
across-the-board examination of the security needs in terms of the 
architecture of a building; the way in which the parking is set 
up;
145 where parking should be, and design changes generally at 
the entrances and exits to accommodate enhanced security 
measures.
146  This new look at design and construction is 
happening across the board, not only in terms of stadiums, but as 
what has to occur in terms of the construction of buildings and the 
reinforcement of buildings generally to enhance security.
147 
But I think there are going to be significant issues as someone 
goes out to build a new stadium, in the post-September 11th era, in 
how it is designed, how to protect against some of those potential 
threat issues. 
PROFESSOR FALLON: On behalf, I am sure, of the audience, 
I want to thank the panel.  I came down from the 
Boston/Cambridge area for this, just to be able to hear this panel.  
If my reaction is in any way representative, you have just been 
terrific, all of you.  Thank you. 
On behalf of the panel, I also I want to thank the audience.  
Your questions have been insightful, provocative, and most 
informative.  Thank you. 
 
145 See,  e.g., Tim Barker, Many Parking Spots Off-Limits; OIA Probably Will Not Open 
Terminal-Top Spaces or Spaces in Garage Close to the Terminal, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Nov. 18, 2001, at A26 (describing the post-September 11th FAA mandate prohibiting any 
vehicle to be left unattended within 300 feet of an airport terminal). 
146 See,  e.g., Dan Haerer, Controlling Access Through Revolving Doors, Horton Doors, 
at http://www.hortondoors.com/Articles/body_article1.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) 
(presenting examples of the types of doors that can be used and the types of changes 
buildings can make to increase security). 
147 See John E. Crawford & Joseph Valancius, Architecture and Terrorism: More 
Efficient Modern Engineering Techniques May Result in Less Safe Structures, 
FASCNET, at http://www.facsnet.org/issues/specials/terrorism/buildingdesign.php3 (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2003).
 